Somalia must seize its chance to break sterile and corrupt mould of
nation-building – By Ahmed M.I. Egal



June 8, 2012


Will Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed hang on to the Presidency after the
TFG's mandate runs out in August?

The impending expiry of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) has occasioned an unseemly rush to establish a ‘permanent’, and
therefore ‘legitimate’, administration in the country.  This forms a
severe test for the Somalia Policy of the Western Powers. That is, if
we can use the term ‘policy’ to describe the alternating bouts of
inertia/neglect and hyperactivity focused upon ill thought-out
conferences at which donor representatives deliver bromides exhorting
Somali ‘ownership’ of the ‘transition process’ and engage in earnest
hand-wringing at the suffering of the people. The salary men TFG
officials (paid by the donor countries) nod obediently and promise to
deliver governance, even as they jockey for position at the trough of
donor contributions.

The simple fact is that the Western Powers would dearly love the
Somali Problem to just go away. However, the emergence of Al-Shabaab
(the Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Horn of Africa) and the pirate gangs
prowling the international sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the
Indian Ocean, have put paid to the easy option. Thus, the West is
forced to seek some sort of ‘solution’.

The current manifestation of the TFG was created in 2009 under the
guidance and design of the Western Powers from the detritus of the
Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia (2006-2009) which they
backed. In light of the glaring failure of the TFG to establish
effective governance even in the small parts of the country under its
control, the Western Powers have come up with the Somalia End of
Transition Roadmap.



The Roadmap purports to outline the steps necessary to establish a
permanent government for Somalia, and end the cycle of successive
transitional ‘governments’ which has prevailed since the collapse of
the Siyad Barre dictatorship in 1991. The Roadmap procedure, under
which the permanent ‘government’ is to be established, mirrors that
under which the TFG was originally established in 2004 when the late
Abdullahi Yusuf acceded to the Presidency. It is therefore unclear why
the ‘government’ to be established in accordance with the Roadmap will
be any more permanent and legitimate than the TFG which it will
replace.

The principal actors of this political farce – erstwhile warlords,
Siyad Barre henchmen, self-appointed civil society leaders, newly
minted clan elders and Diaspora carpet-baggers – will take their usual
places in the drama. They choose the members of parliament and elect
the President through a market process whereby the highest bidders win
the auction of the parliamentary seats and so secure the Presidency.
The pretenders to political position in Somalia and their backers are
past masters at this market-driven process of government formation,
while the people for whom the ‘government’ is supposedly being formed
find the process a welcome and most entertaining diversion from the
Somali-dubbed soap operas and European football that comprises their
normal TV entertainment fare.

The truly galling thing is that the situation in Somalia is very
different now from that which pertained during 2000 when the ill fated
Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed at Arta; during 2004
when the TFG was formed; and during 2008 when the current
manifestation of the TFG was established. The present situation lends
itself much more to the establishment of a truly national and
legitimate government for several reasons. Firstly, the newly expanded
AMISOM force is achieving sustained military success against
Al-Shabaab, while the organisation itself is experiencing slow-motion
disintegration from within.  Hemmed in by Kenyan forces in the south,
Ethiopian forces in the west and increased AMISOM forces from
Mogadishu (not to mention American drone attacks from the air), the
terrorists are being inexorably forced to cede territory and retreat
from urban centres to the bush.

It is also a  result of the widespread fatigue among the people with
the Shabaab’s harsh and foreign strictures against all forms of social
interaction, e.g. music, poetry, dance, theatre. Additionally, the
organisation’s own miscalculations – the banning of aid agencies
providing famine relief and its growing political incoherence as
long-simmering divisions between its various factions come to the fore
– have made it less effective as an organisation.

Secondly, there is a two-pronged dynamic within civil society that is
feeding a growing momentum towards the establishment of a genuine,
grass-roots driven process of national reconciliation and the
establishment of a truly legitimate government. Such a widespread mood
of cautious optimism among the public has not been witnessed in
Somalia since the brief, but heady days of the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC) back in 2006.  The military demise of Al-Shabaab, specifically
their expulsion from Mogadishu and its environs, has created a space
wherein normal life can be re-established. This is evidenced by the
inflow of Diaspora savings into the country, particularly in the real
estate sector in Mogadishu, where there is a small construction boom
as people have begun to rebuild their homes. Somalis are instinctively
entrepreneurial, and the re-emergence of commerce in the capital has
had a big effect upon the psychology of the public.

On the other hand, there is a genuine, widespread and irreversible
fatigue not only with the brutal feudalism of Al-Shabaab, but also
with the endemic corruption and cynical machinations of TFG and the
political class. This can be seen in the evolution of public
perception towards the AMISOM forces from the resistance and hostility
reserved for foreign invaders/occupiers a couple of years ago, to the
resigned acceptance prevalent today as most people have come to view
them as a necessary evil. With respect to the TFG, contrast the
euphoric welcome afforded Sheikh Sharif Ahmed when he arrived in
Mogadishu in 2008 with the cynical, contemptuous amusement with which
he is widely viewed today. He is seen to have evolved from a humble,
unworldly cleric to a designer-suited politician desperately
manipulating all the levers at his disposal in order to hang on to the
Presidency.

This positive public mood and hope for the future needs to be
harnessed in the service of a genuine Somali-driven process of
nation-building and state reconstruction.  Yet, this is precisely what
the so-called Roadmap ignores and precludes in favour of establishing
yet another bogus ‘parliament’ composed of members that have either
bought their seats or which have already been bought and paid for.
This ‘parliament’ will, in turn, ratify a constitution that has not
been put to the people it purports to govern and ‘elect’ a ‘President’
that has succeeded in buying the largest number votes with cash
payments, appeals to tribal solidarity and promises of patronage and
disbursements of aid monies in the future.

It is time to break this sterile and corrupt mould of nation-building
in Somalia in favour of a process that may actually re-establish
political consent and so produce a truly legitimate government.

In order to develop such a process, it is necessary to shift the focus
from the creation of a ‘government’ to establishing the basis for
political consent to a national state. The simple fact, which the
Western Powers have stubbornly continued to ignore, is that the
disintegration of the state in Somalia is due principally to the
collapse of political consent in the country.

The ex-British Protectorate in the north had succeeded in defeating
the national army, ejecting it from their territory and recovering the
sovereignty they had voluntarily surrendered in 1960.  In the ex-UN
Trust Territory in the south, the majority tribe (the Hawiye)
delivered the coup de grace to Siyad Barre’s wounded regime and chased
the aging tyrant ignominiously from the country.  The unifying dream
and ethos of Greater Somalia was dead and lay in tatters among the
debris of the tribal autocracy that had poisoned the dream and turned
it into a nightmare.

Siyad Barre may have been chased out of Somalia, but he left an
inheritance of anarchy, tribal enmity and violence.  This history
underlies, informs and indelibly colours the political zeitgeist of
Somalia to this day, and it is not possible to address the issue of
political consent without a clear appreciation of its impact upon
political and social dynamics.  The notion that the adoption of a
federal model of government with a relatively weak centre and strong,
autonomous regions will adequately address the corrosive effects of
this history is not only facile and uninformed, but in fact misses the
point altogether.

The principal and fundamental unit of socio-political organisation in
Somali society is the clan, and political interaction and
intermediation is undertaken at the level of the clan and sub-clan.
Subsequent to the disintegration of political consent with the
collapse of Siyad Barre’s regime, it is dangerously naïve to assume
that a ‘government’ and state can simply be grafted on to the body
politic of Somalia without addressing the underlying grievances,
hostilities and blood claims of the different communities, both
inter-clan and intra-clan, occasioned by pre- and post-collapse
history. Until these deep and fundamental issues of recent history are
addressed openly and settled between the parties; until the crimes and
atrocities of the past are confronted and claims of blood and honour
are acknowledged and satisfied; genuine reconciliation will not be
achieved and political consent for the re-establishment of the state
and national government will remain unattainable.

Such a process of genuine reconciliation and national re-birth cannot
be achieved through the self serving machinations of the Roadmap. The
experience of Somaliland, which pioneered this approach to national
reconciliation and attendant re-birth of political consent through an
ad-hoc, pragmatic, hit and miss process evidenced by the Burao
Conference of 1991 and the Borama Conference in 1993 is a helpful as
guide.  The situation in Somalia is made more difficult by the fact
that the majority clan there (the Hawiye) is fractured and subject to
as much division within it as between the clans.  Thus, the
reconciliation process must be undertaken on an intra- as well as
inter-clan basis.  This will require much traditional diplomacy,
thoughtful confidence building between the parties and patience.

Somaliland could be of great assistance in facilitating and promoting
such a genuine process of reconciliation. However, the Western Powers
continue to regard formal engagement with Somaliland as an impediment
to the effort to stabilise Somalia, rather than as the essential
requirement for, and logical consequence of, such an effort that it
actually is.  The AU, for its part, views Somaliland’s success in
nation-building and democratisation as a threat and challenge to the
status quo on colonial borders, despite the precedents of Eritrea,
South Sudan and Western Sahara.

Turkey is a new entrant in the group of foreign powers that have
involved themselves in stabilising Somalia, and as an emergent
regional and economic power as well as a predominantly Muslim country
it is to be welcomed.  However, Turkey must and should avoid falling
in step with the barren and myopic mindset of the Western Powers if
its intervention is to bear fruit.

Turkey has not been party to the failed efforts of its Western allies
over the last two decades to find a solution to the collapse of the
Somali state, so it is not invested in this history of failure.  It
must reject the conventional wisdom of its Western partners and use
its fresh eyes to chart a new path; otherwise its intervention will
serve only to aggrandise its own status as a leading Muslim Power,
while contributing nothing of consequence to the stabilisation of
Somalia and the rescue of its people from continued misery and
international oblivion.

Ahmed Egal was educated in the UK and holds a BA in Economics &
Politics from Warwick University and an MA in Area Studies from the
University of London.  He has worked as an international banker in
London and the Gulf Region for over twenty years, and is presently
engaged as an independent financial and  business development
consultant.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob?hl=en.

Reply via email to