The Pivot to Africa

Circumcision, mosquito killing, and other strange doings of Africom.

BY ROSA BROOKS |AUGUST 16, 2012


"A squirrel dying in front of your house may be more relevant to your
interests right now than people dying in Africa," Facebook founder
Mark Zuckerberg is said to have remarked. For most Americans occupying
the now-now-now world of Facebook, this probably feels apt. And until
just over a decade ago, Zuckerberg's statement might equally have
applied to Pentagon strategists. A 1995 strategy document from the
Defense Department was hardly less blunt: "[U]ltimately we see very
little traditional strategic interest in Africa."

That began to change in 1998, when U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania were bombed by al Qaeda, and the 9/11 attacks accelerated the
change. If terrorism thrives in failed states and ungoverned spaces,
it was time to rethink the U.S. approach to Africa, which boasts more
than its fair share of basket-case states. By 2006, Africa had been
bumped up to "high priority" in the U.S. National Security Strategy:
"our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen
fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under …
control."

As the Pentagon struggles to adapt to a world in which security
threats come from increasingly diffuse sources -- and the role of the
military is consequently less and less clear-cut -- Africa has become
a key laboratory for experimentation and change.

In 2007, the United States created a new geographic combatant command
to cover Africa. Africa Command, or Africom, was in part an effort to
rationalize a previously incoherent administrative division of labor,
in which responsibility for Africa had been divided among three other
commands. But it was also a bold experiment: a new kind of command,
designed to reflect the Pentagon's emerging understanding of the more
complex security environment.

In 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had signed Directive
3000.05, which declared that "stability operations" would be a core
military mission with "priority comparable to combat operations." From
its inception, Africom was structured with stability operations,
including conflict prevention, in mind. Unlike other combatant
commands, Africom was expressly designed to take a
"whole-of-government" approach, with senior civilian officials from
the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development,
and other agencies fully integrated into the command's decision-making
structure.

This would, in theory, enable conflict prevention in Africa to be
addressed holistically, rather than through a traditionally narrow
military lens. With its integration of civilian and military power,
Africom would not draw sharp or arbitrary distinctions between
defense, development, and diplomacy; all three would go hand in hand.
And this, President George W. Bush declared, would help "bring peace
and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of
development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth."

The resulting range of Africom's activities might cause heartburn for
those committed to viewing U.S. military power strictly through a
war-fighting lens. Consider this snapshot of recent activities
undertaken by or with the assistance of Africom:
 Construction of school classrooms in Chad
Research on the "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights
Violations With Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo"
Cattle vaccination in Uganda, designed to provide healthy cattle to
internally displaced civilians returning to their homes
Activities to combat drug trafficking through the West Africa
Cooperative Security Initiative
Construction of closed wells with solar-powered pumps in Senegal
Establishment of an East African Malaria Task Force to combat "one of
the biggest killers on the continent: the mosquito"
Development of a news and information website aimed at local audiences
in the Maghreb region, featuring "analysis, interviews and commentary
by paid Magharebia correspondents"
Construction of a maternal- and pediatric-care ward at a Ugandan hospital
Collaboration with Botswana's military to "promote Botswana's national
program of education, HIV screening and male circumcision surgeries"
Cooperation with the Sierra Leone Maritime Wing and Fisheries Ministry
that "result[ed] in the apprehension of an illegally operating fishing
vessel"

Most of these activities sound laudable. Few would strike the average
American as "military" in nature.

Of course, Africom also conducts or facilitates a wide range of more
traditional military activities, including various counterterrorism
programs run through Operation Enduring Freedom- -Trans Sahara and a
range of efforts to help capture Lord’s Resistance Army leaders in
Central and East Africa. In 2011, Africom coordinated its first
large-scale military operation when President Obama approved Operation
Odyssey Dawn, which aimed to enforce the UN-sanctioned no-fly zone in
Libya and eliminate the Libyan government’s ability to threaten
civilians.

Whether Africom represents a viable new model for the future of the
U.S. military naturally depends on your point of view. To some, the
Africom approach is downright dangerous. Military traditionalists are
apt to view it with suspicion -- as a dangerous slide away from the
military's core competencies and the very apotheosis of "mission
creep." Many civilian observers are equally skeptical, viewing Africom
as further evidence of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy --
and of the devaluing and evisceration of civilian capacity. "The
Pentagon is muscling in everywhere," complained former State
Department official Thomas Schweich in a Washington Post op-ed: "[W]hy
exactly do we need a military command [in Africa] running civilian
reconstruction, if not to usurp the efforts led by well-respected U.S.
embassies and aid officials?"

Such views are understandable but shortsighted. The Pentagon is right
to see poverty, underdevelopment, disease, repression, human rights
abuses, and conflict as likely drivers of future security threats to
the United States. And if the Defense Department's job is to protect
the United States, that mission must surely include preventing
threats.

In some imaginary utopia, the military might work hand in hand with
capable, well-resourced civilian agencies, neatly dividing up roles
and leaving the "civilian" tasks to the civilians. But that's not the
world we live in. Yes, the civilian sector has been eviscerated by two
decades of underresourcing and has consequently struggled to attract
and retain personnel with key skills. But given today's political
climate, this situation is unlikely to change -- at least not in the
foreseeable future. Congress shows zero interest in substantially
boosting the foreign affairs budget. That's a crying shame, but it is
what it is.

Inevitably, this means that the Defense Department will have to step
into the breach. How could it responsibly refrain? As a State
Department inspector general's report commented in 2009, Africom's
role was "resented and challenged" by the State Department's Bureau of
African Affairs, but the military was essentially "stepping into a
void created by a lack of resources for traditional development" and
other "civilian" tasks.

More importantly, the lines between "civilian" and "military" tasks
have never been as clear as we like to pretend, and today they're
blurrier than ever. Instead of wasting time in a fruitless effort to
draw imaginary lines between civilian and military roles, the United
States should focus instead on doing what needs to be done -- and
doing it responsibly, transparently, and well.

That's where the country has been falling badly short. Africom has
been justly criticized for failing to live up to its lofty goals. A
clumsy early rollout also left Africom struggling to allay African
suspicions that the United States intended to "recolonize" Africa, and
for a variety of reasons (shortage of qualified and interested
personnel, inadequate career incentives, a slow-moving personnel
system), many civilian slots within Africom were never filled. Those
that were filled weren't always put to good use, and Africom continues
to struggle to coordinate its efforts with civilian agencies.

The Defense Department is a relative amateur when it comes to
development and related activities, and often it shows. Lack of
cultural awareness has plagued programming: The distribution of used
clothes in Djibouti during Ramadan offended Muslim sensibilities, for
instance, and Africom has also been criticized for failing to take
local clan relationships into account when distributing assistance.

Poor management is also a serious problem. Africom's first commander,
General William “Kip” Ward, is currently under investigation for
alleged misuse of funds. A 2011 Government Accountability Office
report on DOD humanitarian activities found systemic management and
accountability problems across the Defense Department, concluding
grimly that, while there have been some improvements over the years,
"DOD does not have complete information on the full range of
humanitarian assistance projects it conducts.… DOD does not know …
when a project is going to be implemented, when it is in progress, or
when and if it has been completed.… DOD does not know how much it has
spent.… DOD is not consistently evaluating its projects, and therefore
it cannot determine whether its humanitarian assistance efforts are
meeting their intended goals, having positive effects, or represent an
efficient use of resources."

These problems are not unique to Africom. As other combatant commands
have similarly expanded their activities into traditionally civilian
domains, they have struggled with similar problems and criticism.

In a sense, we currently inhabit the worst of all possible worlds: The
military is increasingly taking on traditionally civilian jobs but
doing them clumsily and often halfheartedly, without investing fully
in developing the skills necessary for success. Meanwhile, civilian
agencies mostly just grumble from the sidelines, waiting for that
happy day when Congress gets serious about rebuilding civilian
capacity. (I think Samuel Beckett wrote a play about that.) And few
people, inside or outside the Pentagon, are taking seriously the need
to think in new ways about what "whole-of-government" or a holistic
approach to security might truly mean.

The blurring of civilian and military roles is inevitable, but the
failure to grapple effectively with this blurring of roles is not. To
address threats (and seize opportunities) in this globalized, blurry,
chaotic world, we will need to develop new competencies, flexible new
structures, and creative new accountability mechanisms. Most
critically, we'll need to let go of our comfortable old assumptions
about roles and missions.


 Rosa Brooks is a law professor at Georgetown University and a
Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation. She served as a
counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to
2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State
Department. Her weekly column runs every Thursday and is accompanied
by a blog, By Other Means.

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