Two presidents and an intervention: Gambia is not Côte d’Ivoire, but
it can learn from it
Posted on January 19, 2017 by Marika Tsolakis
The similarities between Gambia today and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-11 may
be most relevant not in how the intervention unfolds, but in what
happens once a new government is installed.
The streets of the capital Banjul have reportedly been quiet as
Gambians stay indoors. Credit: Babak Fakhamzadeh.
The streets of the capital Banjul have reportedly been quiet as
Gambians stay indoors. Credit: Babak Fakhamzadeh.
With the inauguration of Adama Barrow at the Gambian embassy in
neighbouring Senegal this afternoon, The Gambia now has two men
claiming to be its president. The other, Yahya Jammeh, remains in the
country, refusing to relinquish power 23 years after he seized it,
despite the threat of armed intervention by regional forces who insist
that he lost the December 2016 elections.
These dynamics may remind many of the standoff in Gambia’s West
African neighbour of Côte d’Ivoire back in 2010-11.
In that impasse, the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo also rejected electoral
results and clung to power, trying to project a veneer of legitimacy
and constitutionality. His opponent Alassane Ouattara – also supported
by foreign powers who saw him as representing new possibilities of
democracy, human rights and improved external relationships – held an
inauguration too, leading the country to have two concurrent
presidents. And, as with Gambia today, international armed forces
stood ready to intervene to depose the sitting ruler.
These similarities may be cause for concern as Senegalese reportedly
enter The Gambia. After all, in Côte d’Ivoire’s ensuing four-month
conflict, at least 1,500 people were killed and over a million were
displaced as French and UN-backed troops overthrew Gbagbo and
installed Ouattara. The country is still far from resolving its
underlying discords, as brought into stark relief by the army mutinies
in the past week or so.
However, despite the many likenesses, The Gambia’s situation today is
also very different from Côte d’Ivoire’s. And it is in understanding
both the similarities and dissimilarities that we can shed some light
on the potential challenges and pitfalls the country will face in
moving on from this highly uncertain crisis point.
Why The Gambia isn’t Côte d’Ivoire
The Gambia’s situation today is different from Côte d’Ivoire in
2010-11 for several reasons.
To begin with, although both have wished to stay in power and engaged
in divisive and anti-imperialist rhetoric, Jammeh is not Gbagbo.
Jammeh came to power in a military coup in 1994 as a relatively
unknown soldier. Gbabgo, on the other hand, was a central political
player in Côte d’Ivoire before coming to power in 2000. Both may have
masked some of their policies in an anti-imperialist discourse, but
whereas Gbagbo, a former academic, began with a serious socialist
analysis and vision, Jammeh’s often feel like an afterthought.
In power, Gbagbo espoused a discourse of Ivoirité, a hypernationalist
brand of ethnic politics that marginalised Northern, Muslim and
second-generation Ivoirians and led to rising internal tensions. But
while Jammeh has brutally discriminated against homosexuals and
political opponents, he has only dipped his toes into ethnic politics
with comments in 2015 against the Mandinkas, The Gambia’s largest
ethnic group, which may have in part cost him the polls.
Secondly, Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 is not The Gambia in 2017 in terms of
potential for inner and prolonged conflict. At the time of elections
in 2010, Côte d’Ivoire was still reeling from eight years of
instability and violence, and almost 17 years of increasingly
divisive, ethnicised politics. Ivoirians on both sides were mobilised
to fight and many reacted immediately to messages from politicians and
their emissaries through media and street-level political forums.
In The Gambia by contrast, Barrow, Jammeh and other prominent figures
have actively discouraged citizens from disturbing peace, while the
country’s small population does not even equal the number of Ivoirians
in the dense urban areas of Abidjan where violence occurred in 2011.
Furthermore, while in Côte d’Ivoire Gbagbo loyalists stood by his
side, in Gambia, several members of Jammeh’s cabinet have fled the
country and the degree of military backing remains unknown.
[Gambia: Why the army may be the key to getting Jammeh to step down]
Finally, Gambia’s elections are not Côte d’Ivoire’s elections in terms
of international implications. Due to The Gambia’s relative political
isolation, no accusations of foreign intervention or support for one
candidate were made. Barrow was a newcomer to the political game, the
ideal person to unite a disparate coalition of seven political
parties.
Conversely in Côte d’Ivoire, the French and international community
played an active role in the conflict and did not hide their support
for Ouattara. International interests in the resource-rich country
opened the field to bitter accusations of foreign intervention and
provided an avenue to illegitimise Ouattara’s victory. This will not
be the case in The Gambia.
What we can learn from Côte d’Ivoire
All this suggests that as regional West African forces intervene, the
kind of bloody conflict and displacement seen in Côte d’Ivoire is
unlikely to be replicated.
However, unless the full experience of Côte d’Ivoire is understood,
there is a danger that some of the mistakes made in the aftermath of
military intervention could be repeated. Indeed, the similarities
between the situations that do exist may be at their most relevant not
in how the intervention may unfold, but in how they affect the
countries once the new government has been installed.
Partly as a result of foreign intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, for
example, many Gbagbo supporters still consider Ouattara’s victory the
result of a coup led by France and others. This belief has prevented
many from accepting new leadership and contributed to widespread
boycotts of elections that prolong political divisions to this day.
This has been exacerbated by the feeling that true justice was never
served and that reconciliation was not achieved, a fact not helped by
perception that Ouattara is privileging his fellow northerners in
government.
Both Barrow and forces readying to intervene therefore ought to be
acutely sensitive to similar dynamics emerging in The Gambia amongst
those who perceive themselves to be on the losing end of a foreign
military intervention and contested election. While Barrow has the
support of many Gambians and a broad host of international actors, the
new government must take care to engage with all parties and
ethnicities in The Gambia as promised in Barrow’s platform and
practice an equal justice.
The Gambia could also learn from its neighbour’s experience of how to
move forwards with a coalition government. In Côte d’Ivoire, the
five-party coalition that facilitated Ouattara’s 2010 victory was
maintained in 2015 campaign. However, the decision to maintain the
coalition by party leaders angered voters who felt that the political
field had been unfairly narrowed.
While promoting inclusion and reconciliation, The Gambia must also
consider strategies to encourage autonomy and competition from the
start, and allow for a dynamic political playing field to exist. This
is unchartered terrain for a country that has existed under Jammeh’s
repressive regime for over two decades, but while the end of this
reign may be widely celebrated, the truly difficult work of building
an inclusive and democratic future and avoiding countless pitfalls
will begin with the new government’s earliest decisions.
There are many parallels to be drawn between the current political
crisis in The Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire’s recent past, but the focus of
these comparisons should be to encourage a progressive new Gambian
state instead of foreshadowing prolonged instability. The Gambia is
not Africa’s next Côte d’Ivoire but it can certainly learn from its
experiences.
Dr Marika Tsolakis is a Global Challenges Research Fund postdoctoral
research fellow at University College London, Institute of Education.
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2 thoughts on “Two presidents and an intervention: Gambia is not Côte
d’Ivoire, but it can learn from it”
Joan Vives Tomas says:
January 20, 2017 at 7:36 am
Great article.
momodou lamin lowe says:
January 20, 2017 at 11:16 am
African political leaders should leaarn to dispensiate fairly
amongst their citizens by also promoting civic education to enable the
people solve issues of concern with dialogue and diplomacy
always.through experience i understand most of the leaders use a
devide and rule strategy to stay longer in power.that deprive
authorities from dispensiating fairly in almost all the arms of
government.in these type of situations generally,education as the
driving source of progress and devolopment is restricted in some
way.this is aim to deprive the masses being aware of facts governing
their affairs which they will come to know sooner or later
gradually.you may call it different names ,but the reality is when
your people becomes aware they will rise for equal shares.
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