> On 22 Sep 2020, at 13:30, Gerry | Rigatta <gjacob...@rigatta.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Daniel,
> 
> your frustration is understandable and I hope you excuse a further comment. 
> What is missing, IMVHO, is a central point of reference for all Kamailio 
> security issues. Googling for “Kamailio security” reveals 
> https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-15820/Kamailio.html 
> <https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-15820/Kamailio.html> 
> as the most comprehensive source. However it lacks this latest header bug.
> 
https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy 
<https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy>

Maybe we should make it easier to find from the home page as you did not find 
it.

/O
> My suggestion would be to create a special “Security Advisories” page on the 
> kamailio website which points to security news, so that Google indexes that 
> page. As for example Asterisk has 
> https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories/ 
> <https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories/>
> 
> And create on github an extra “security” label so one can filter for that. 
> https://github.com/kamailio/kamailio/labels 
> <https://github.com/kamailio/kamailio/labels>
> And then point from the above mentioned “Security Advisories” page to a 
> filtered github view.
> 
> Thanks for your great work on Kamailio. Its highly appreciated!
> 
> Best Gerry
> 
> 
>> On 22 Sep 2020, at 12:55, Daniel-Constantin Mierla <mico...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:mico...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> At least in my case you push out some inaccurate information. I never said 
>> my "deployments were not affected since non-standard headers were not used".
>> 
>> Iirc, I only said that none of my deployments were affected by this issue -- 
>> respectively quoting from my message: "None of my deployments were 
>> affected." 
>> from:https://lists.kamailio.org/pipermail/sr-users/2020-September/110315.html
>>  <https://lists.kamailio.org/pipermail/sr-users/2020-September/110315.html> 
>> . If I am mistaken and you found another remark from me, just point to my 
>> message from where you got that.
>> 
>> So, for further clarification: either non standard headers were used for 
>> non-security related features (e.g., used for troubleshooting purposes) or 
>> the issue didn't affect the deployments from different perspective (e.g., 
>> traffic was checked to be from a trusted source).
>> 
>> And remember that the issue was not with remove_hf() function itself, like 
>> it is somehow propagated by blog posts, but it was in the parser, so use of 
>> custom headers between two kamailio was not affected if an edge proxy did 
>> something like:
>> 
>> remove_hf("X-H");
>> 
>> append_hf("X-H: abc\r\n");
>> 
>> And then, if next hop Kamailio was using $hdr(X-H), it will get "abc" (value 
>> added by previous Kamailio), not what a bad actor would add as "X-H : 
>> badvalue\r\n" sip header.
>> 
>> Then you listed two commits you consider there should have been security 
>> advisories about. Have you analysed the code and found cases where security 
>> was affected, or is just your opinion in based on the commit message and 
>> code patch?
>> 
>> First, I would love that one or many spend time to dissect commits and see 
>> their security implication. I am more that happy when someone does it and 
>> let's everyone be aware of, also to write and publish appropriate advisory.
>> 
>> Otherwise, for those two specific commits you listed, the one from Federico 
>> is a memory leak, I haven't spent time on going deeper to find the specific 
>> cases, From header should be parsed in SIP requests. My commit was done 
>> based on a static code analyzer and again I was not spending time to see 
>> what implications are.
>> 
>> In general, in the code we work a lot with str structure (non-zero 
>> terminated char* and len), many of the "safety" commits done lately were to 
>> silent static code analysers, not meaning that it was a real issue found 
>> behind. Some can be, and here we appreciate the time and effort of people 
>> like you to dissect them and make appropriate advisories.
>> 
>> I would like people do verify what they write about what specific people (of 
>> course, specially for my person) said before pushing out, and eventually 
>> validate a commit to fix something has security impact, instead of just 
>> personal guessing, if the intention is to help the project and not to create 
>> more confusion or other reactions for what so ever reasons.
>> 
>> This should be my last comment on the thread, I do not want to spend any 
>> more time in clarifying what people think I said or I did.
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> Daniel
>> 
>> On 22.09.20 11:31, Sandro Gauci wrote:
>>> I know I am waking up an old debate by replying to this thread. Deeply 
>>> sorry :-)
>>> 
>>> Finally got around to writing up a blog post about this very thread where I 
>>> (think) I spared absolutely no one, not even myself. 
>>> 
>>> My post is called "The great Kamailio security debate and some 
>>> misconceptions debunked" and can be read here:
>>> 
>>> https://www.rtcsec.com/2020/09/02-kamailio-security-debate-and-misconceptions/
>>>  
>>> <https://www.rtcsec.com/2020/09/02-kamailio-security-debate-and-misconceptions/>
>>> 
>>> The ToC:
>>> Introduction
>>> A bit of background before diving in
>>> Claim: this issue does not affect many organisations
>>> Claim: custom headers are only known to internal users
>>> Claim: if it’s an 18 year old bug, it can’t have been high risk
>>> Claim: this should have been found if people were doing proper testing
>>> Claim: infrequent advisories = project is not serious about security
>>> Claim: limited number of advisories = project is more secure
>>> Claim: if you’re serious about security, monitor the mailing lists
>>> Claim: security experts should decide what is a security vulnerability
>>> Discussion: when should the project publish an advisory?
>>> Discussion: educational security role
>>> Moving forward
>>> Hope that it is at least interesting and perhaps even constructive!
>>> 
>>> Best wishes,
>>> 
>>> --
>>>  
>>>     Sandro Gauci, CEO at Enable Security GmbH
>>> 
>>>     Register of Companies:      AG Charlottenburg HRB 173016 B
>>>     Company HQ:                       Pappelallee 78/79, 10437 Berlin, 
>>> Germany
>>>     PGP/Encrypted comms:     https://keybase.io/sandrogauci 
>>> <https://keybase.io/sandrogauci>
>>>     Our blog:                                https://www.rtcsec.com 
>>> <https://www.rtcsec.com/>
>>>     Other points of contact:      https://enablesecurity.com/#contact-us 
>>> <https://enablesecurity.com/#contact-us>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thu, 3 Sep 2020, at 10:34 AM, Olle E. Johansson wrote:
>>>> Well, you have defined one definitive line between being stupid and 
>>>> following some current practise :-)
>>>> 
>>>> I like to think we as a project have an educational role as well. In this 
>>>> case explaining the bug we had and what it can cause.
>>>> We should definitely add a warning along the lines you write too - relying 
>>>> on headers alone is bad and not best current practise.
>>>> 
>>>> /O
>>>> 
>>>>> On 3 Sep 2020, at 10:14, davy van de moere <davy.van.de.mo...@gmail.com 
>>>>> <mailto:davy.van.de.mo...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> After 20 years in voip, my 2 cents on this, if you succeed in creating a 
>>>>> voip system where the security of the whole relies on the ability to 
>>>>> remove (or only keep specific) custom sip headers, you will wake up one 
>>>>> morning realizing a bunch of people in Palestine made a gazillion calls 
>>>>> over your system to expensive destinations, bringing you to or over the 
>>>>> edge of bankruptcy.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Security should be multilayered, one header sneaking through should not 
>>>>> give any big problems. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> From a security point of view, this could be called a 'normal' security 
>>>>> risk, I think. It's a bit more than low as you can do more than just get 
>>>>> some info, but it's not high, as you would need to have many other 
>>>>> factors going wrong to get to a successful exploit. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Op do 3 sep. 2020 om 09:18 schreef Olle E. Johansson <o...@edvina.net 
>>>>> <mailto:o...@edvina.net>>:
>>>>> One thought - we may have to separate security vulnerability reporting 
>>>>> from security advisory documents. I think in some cases, where a common 
>>>>> use of a product can lead to issues (but it is not clearly a bug that 
>>>>> cause crashes in our code) we may have to send out an advisory and 
>>>>> publish it in the same way. The problem with that is where the border is 
>>>>> between just doing stupid things like taking SQL statements from SIP 
>>>>> headers and issues like this that are harder to catch.
>>>>> 
>>>>> We had a long and hard discussion about this in the Asterisk project many 
>>>>> years ago - a very common dialplan construct (that was documented in many 
>>>>> places) was indeed very dangerous. It wasn’t any code in asterisk that 
>>>>> caused the issue, just a common dialplan construct that existed in many, 
>>>>> many production systems. In the end, if I remember correctly, the project 
>>>>> issued an advisory and added a README about it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Maybe that’s a way forward.
>>>>> 
>>>>> /O
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 2 Sep 2020, at 21:25, Henning Westerholt <h...@skalatan.de 
>>>>>> <mailto:h...@skalatan.de>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Hello Maxim,
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> have a look to the first sentence:
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> “A security vulnerability is (for example) when a user of Kamailio can 
>>>>>> cause Kamailio to crash or lock up by sending messages to the server 
>>>>>> process.”
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> So there is some limitation regarding vulnerability criticality defined 
>>>>>> in there. But of course (as I already mentioned), it might be improved 
>>>>>> to e.g. use CVSS scoring instead.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Henning
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> From: Maxim Sobolev <sobo...@sippysoft.com 
>>>>>> <mailto:sobo...@sippysoft.com>> 
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 9:15 PM
>>>>>> To: Henning Westerholt <h...@skalatan.de <mailto:h...@skalatan.de>>
>>>>>> Cc: Daniel-Constantin Mierla <mico...@gmail.com 
>>>>>> <mailto:mico...@gmail.com>>; yufei....@gmail.com 
>>>>>> <mailto:yufei....@gmail.com>; Olle E. Johansson <o...@edvina.net 
>>>>>> <mailto:o...@edvina.net>>; Gerry | Rigatta <gjacob...@rigatta.com 
>>>>>> <mailto:gjacob...@rigatta.com>>; Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List 
>>>>>> <sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org>>; 
>>>>>> jbro...@signalogic.com <mailto:jbro...@signalogic.com>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [SR-Users] Kamailio vulnerable to header smuggling possible 
>>>>>> due to bypass of remove_hf
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 11:30 AM Henning Westerholt <h...@skalatan.de 
>>>>>> <mailto:h...@skalatan.de>> wrote:
>>>>>> Hello Maxim,
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> thank you for the clarification, appreciated.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> No worries, hope to have a civilized discussion.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Just one clarification, my comment regarding the advisory from 2018 was 
>>>>>> not meant as advertisement etc..
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Point taken, I dramatized of course to underline my point. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> One suggestion to objectify the whole discussion, there exists a 
>>>>>> well-known and accepted metric for vulnerabilities: CVSS [1]
>>>>>> If I calculate the CVSS score for this issue, it results in a medium 
>>>>>> level with score 5.8. But this is of course again (at least somewhat) 
>>>>>> influenced from my point of view to this bug.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Some projects have a policy to only do a security announcement for 
>>>>>> vulnerabilities with score high and critical. For Kamailio this is not 
>>>>>> yet defined in a detailed way, due to the size of the project and other 
>>>>>> factors.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> So, If people in this discussion (or other people on the list) are 
>>>>>> interested in improving the project security processes – this wiki page 
>>>>>> with the current process might be a good starting 
>>>>>> point:https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy 
>>>>>> <https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy>
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Please suggest your improvements to the existing process (preferable in 
>>>>>> a new discussion thread) on the sr-dev list. If you want to do it in 
>>>>>> private, feel free contact the management list.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Well, first suggestion after having read it: to start actually following 
>>>>>> what's documented before any improvements are made. ;-) The policy says 
>>>>>> plain and simple (quote):
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Publishing security vulnerabilities
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Kamailio will publish security vulnerabilities, including an CVE ID, on 
>>>>>> the kamailio-business mailing list, sr-dev, sr-users as well as related 
>>>>>> lists. The advisories will also be published on the kamailio.org 
>>>>>> <http://kamailio.org/> web site. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> CVE entries should be created for vulnerabilities in the core and major 
>>>>>> modules, for rarely used modules this is not necessary. If there are 
>>>>>> several security issues together in one release, they should be 
>>>>>> announced together.  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> I might be missing something obvious, but there is no "if" or "maybe" or 
>>>>>> "it depends". Any module that has been 18 years with the project 
>>>>>> qualifies to be a "major module" to me... 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -Max
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users>
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>>>>> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users 
>>>>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users>
>>>> 
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users>
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
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>> -- 
>> Daniel-Constantin Mierla -- www.asipto.com <http://www.asipto.com/>
>> www.twitter.com/miconda <http://www.twitter.com/miconda> -- 
>> www.linkedin.com/in/miconda <http://www.linkedin.com/in/miconda>
>> Funding: https://www.paypal.me/dcmierla 
>> <https://www.paypal.me/dcmierla>_______________________________________________
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