> On 22 Sep 2020, at 13:30, Gerry | Rigatta <gjacob...@rigatta.com> wrote: > > Hi Daniel, > > your frustration is understandable and I hope you excuse a further comment. > What is missing, IMVHO, is a central point of reference for all Kamailio > security issues. Googling for “Kamailio security” reveals > https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-15820/Kamailio.html > <https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-15820/Kamailio.html> > as the most comprehensive source. However it lacks this latest header bug. > https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy <https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy>
Maybe we should make it easier to find from the home page as you did not find it. /O > My suggestion would be to create a special “Security Advisories” page on the > kamailio website which points to security news, so that Google indexes that > page. As for example Asterisk has > https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories/ > <https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories/> > > And create on github an extra “security” label so one can filter for that. > https://github.com/kamailio/kamailio/labels > <https://github.com/kamailio/kamailio/labels> > And then point from the above mentioned “Security Advisories” page to a > filtered github view. > > Thanks for your great work on Kamailio. Its highly appreciated! > > Best Gerry > > >> On 22 Sep 2020, at 12:55, Daniel-Constantin Mierla <mico...@gmail.com >> <mailto:mico...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> At least in my case you push out some inaccurate information. I never said >> my "deployments were not affected since non-standard headers were not used". >> >> Iirc, I only said that none of my deployments were affected by this issue -- >> respectively quoting from my message: "None of my deployments were >> affected." >> from:https://lists.kamailio.org/pipermail/sr-users/2020-September/110315.html >> <https://lists.kamailio.org/pipermail/sr-users/2020-September/110315.html> >> . If I am mistaken and you found another remark from me, just point to my >> message from where you got that. >> >> So, for further clarification: either non standard headers were used for >> non-security related features (e.g., used for troubleshooting purposes) or >> the issue didn't affect the deployments from different perspective (e.g., >> traffic was checked to be from a trusted source). >> >> And remember that the issue was not with remove_hf() function itself, like >> it is somehow propagated by blog posts, but it was in the parser, so use of >> custom headers between two kamailio was not affected if an edge proxy did >> something like: >> >> remove_hf("X-H"); >> >> append_hf("X-H: abc\r\n"); >> >> And then, if next hop Kamailio was using $hdr(X-H), it will get "abc" (value >> added by previous Kamailio), not what a bad actor would add as "X-H : >> badvalue\r\n" sip header. >> >> Then you listed two commits you consider there should have been security >> advisories about. Have you analysed the code and found cases where security >> was affected, or is just your opinion in based on the commit message and >> code patch? >> >> First, I would love that one or many spend time to dissect commits and see >> their security implication. I am more that happy when someone does it and >> let's everyone be aware of, also to write and publish appropriate advisory. >> >> Otherwise, for those two specific commits you listed, the one from Federico >> is a memory leak, I haven't spent time on going deeper to find the specific >> cases, From header should be parsed in SIP requests. My commit was done >> based on a static code analyzer and again I was not spending time to see >> what implications are. >> >> In general, in the code we work a lot with str structure (non-zero >> terminated char* and len), many of the "safety" commits done lately were to >> silent static code analysers, not meaning that it was a real issue found >> behind. Some can be, and here we appreciate the time and effort of people >> like you to dissect them and make appropriate advisories. >> >> I would like people do verify what they write about what specific people (of >> course, specially for my person) said before pushing out, and eventually >> validate a commit to fix something has security impact, instead of just >> personal guessing, if the intention is to help the project and not to create >> more confusion or other reactions for what so ever reasons. >> >> This should be my last comment on the thread, I do not want to spend any >> more time in clarifying what people think I said or I did. >> >> Cheers, >> Daniel >> >> On 22.09.20 11:31, Sandro Gauci wrote: >>> I know I am waking up an old debate by replying to this thread. Deeply >>> sorry :-) >>> >>> Finally got around to writing up a blog post about this very thread where I >>> (think) I spared absolutely no one, not even myself. >>> >>> My post is called "The great Kamailio security debate and some >>> misconceptions debunked" and can be read here: >>> >>> https://www.rtcsec.com/2020/09/02-kamailio-security-debate-and-misconceptions/ >>> >>> <https://www.rtcsec.com/2020/09/02-kamailio-security-debate-and-misconceptions/> >>> >>> The ToC: >>> Introduction >>> A bit of background before diving in >>> Claim: this issue does not affect many organisations >>> Claim: custom headers are only known to internal users >>> Claim: if it’s an 18 year old bug, it can’t have been high risk >>> Claim: this should have been found if people were doing proper testing >>> Claim: infrequent advisories = project is not serious about security >>> Claim: limited number of advisories = project is more secure >>> Claim: if you’re serious about security, monitor the mailing lists >>> Claim: security experts should decide what is a security vulnerability >>> Discussion: when should the project publish an advisory? >>> Discussion: educational security role >>> Moving forward >>> Hope that it is at least interesting and perhaps even constructive! >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Sandro Gauci, CEO at Enable Security GmbH >>> >>> Register of Companies: AG Charlottenburg HRB 173016 B >>> Company HQ: Pappelallee 78/79, 10437 Berlin, >>> Germany >>> PGP/Encrypted comms: https://keybase.io/sandrogauci >>> <https://keybase.io/sandrogauci> >>> Our blog: https://www.rtcsec.com >>> <https://www.rtcsec.com/> >>> Other points of contact: https://enablesecurity.com/#contact-us >>> <https://enablesecurity.com/#contact-us> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, 3 Sep 2020, at 10:34 AM, Olle E. Johansson wrote: >>>> Well, you have defined one definitive line between being stupid and >>>> following some current practise :-) >>>> >>>> I like to think we as a project have an educational role as well. In this >>>> case explaining the bug we had and what it can cause. >>>> We should definitely add a warning along the lines you write too - relying >>>> on headers alone is bad and not best current practise. >>>> >>>> /O >>>> >>>>> On 3 Sep 2020, at 10:14, davy van de moere <davy.van.de.mo...@gmail.com >>>>> <mailto:davy.van.de.mo...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> After 20 years in voip, my 2 cents on this, if you succeed in creating a >>>>> voip system where the security of the whole relies on the ability to >>>>> remove (or only keep specific) custom sip headers, you will wake up one >>>>> morning realizing a bunch of people in Palestine made a gazillion calls >>>>> over your system to expensive destinations, bringing you to or over the >>>>> edge of bankruptcy. >>>>> >>>>> Security should be multilayered, one header sneaking through should not >>>>> give any big problems. >>>>> >>>>> From a security point of view, this could be called a 'normal' security >>>>> risk, I think. It's a bit more than low as you can do more than just get >>>>> some info, but it's not high, as you would need to have many other >>>>> factors going wrong to get to a successful exploit. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Op do 3 sep. 2020 om 09:18 schreef Olle E. Johansson <o...@edvina.net >>>>> <mailto:o...@edvina.net>>: >>>>> One thought - we may have to separate security vulnerability reporting >>>>> from security advisory documents. I think in some cases, where a common >>>>> use of a product can lead to issues (but it is not clearly a bug that >>>>> cause crashes in our code) we may have to send out an advisory and >>>>> publish it in the same way. The problem with that is where the border is >>>>> between just doing stupid things like taking SQL statements from SIP >>>>> headers and issues like this that are harder to catch. >>>>> >>>>> We had a long and hard discussion about this in the Asterisk project many >>>>> years ago - a very common dialplan construct (that was documented in many >>>>> places) was indeed very dangerous. It wasn’t any code in asterisk that >>>>> caused the issue, just a common dialplan construct that existed in many, >>>>> many production systems. In the end, if I remember correctly, the project >>>>> issued an advisory and added a README about it. >>>>> >>>>> Maybe that’s a way forward. >>>>> >>>>> /O >>>>> >>>>>> On 2 Sep 2020, at 21:25, Henning Westerholt <h...@skalatan.de >>>>>> <mailto:h...@skalatan.de>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hello Maxim, >>>>>> >>>>>> have a look to the first sentence: >>>>>> >>>>>> “A security vulnerability is (for example) when a user of Kamailio can >>>>>> cause Kamailio to crash or lock up by sending messages to the server >>>>>> process.” >>>>>> >>>>>> So there is some limitation regarding vulnerability criticality defined >>>>>> in there. But of course (as I already mentioned), it might be improved >>>>>> to e.g. use CVSS scoring instead. >>>>>> >>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>> >>>>>> Henning >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Maxim Sobolev <sobo...@sippysoft.com >>>>>> <mailto:sobo...@sippysoft.com>> >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 9:15 PM >>>>>> To: Henning Westerholt <h...@skalatan.de <mailto:h...@skalatan.de>> >>>>>> Cc: Daniel-Constantin Mierla <mico...@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:mico...@gmail.com>>; yufei....@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:yufei....@gmail.com>; Olle E. Johansson <o...@edvina.net >>>>>> <mailto:o...@edvina.net>>; Gerry | Rigatta <gjacob...@rigatta.com >>>>>> <mailto:gjacob...@rigatta.com>>; Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List >>>>>> <sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org>>; >>>>>> jbro...@signalogic.com <mailto:jbro...@signalogic.com> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [SR-Users] Kamailio vulnerable to header smuggling possible >>>>>> due to bypass of remove_hf >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 11:30 AM Henning Westerholt <h...@skalatan.de >>>>>> <mailto:h...@skalatan.de>> wrote: >>>>>> Hello Maxim, >>>>>> >>>>>> thank you for the clarification, appreciated. >>>>>> >>>>>> No worries, hope to have a civilized discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Just one clarification, my comment regarding the advisory from 2018 was >>>>>> not meant as advertisement etc.. >>>>>> >>>>>> Point taken, I dramatized of course to underline my point. >>>>>> >>>>>> One suggestion to objectify the whole discussion, there exists a >>>>>> well-known and accepted metric for vulnerabilities: CVSS [1] >>>>>> If I calculate the CVSS score for this issue, it results in a medium >>>>>> level with score 5.8. But this is of course again (at least somewhat) >>>>>> influenced from my point of view to this bug. >>>>>> >>>>>> Some projects have a policy to only do a security announcement for >>>>>> vulnerabilities with score high and critical. For Kamailio this is not >>>>>> yet defined in a detailed way, due to the size of the project and other >>>>>> factors. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, If people in this discussion (or other people on the list) are >>>>>> interested in improving the project security processes – this wiki page >>>>>> with the current process might be a good starting >>>>>> point:https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy >>>>>> <https://www.kamailio.org/wiki/security/policy> >>>>>> >>>>>> Please suggest your improvements to the existing process (preferable in >>>>>> a new discussion thread) on the sr-dev list. If you want to do it in >>>>>> private, feel free contact the management list. >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, first suggestion after having read it: to start actually following >>>>>> what's documented before any improvements are made. ;-) The policy says >>>>>> plain and simple (quote): >>>>>> >>>>>> Publishing security vulnerabilities >>>>>> >>>>>> Kamailio will publish security vulnerabilities, including an CVE ID, on >>>>>> the kamailio-business mailing list, sr-dev, sr-users as well as related >>>>>> lists. The advisories will also be published on the kamailio.org >>>>>> <http://kamailio.org/> web site. >>>>>> >>>>>> CVE entries should be created for vulnerabilities in the core and major >>>>>> modules, for rarely used modules this is not necessary. If there are >>>>>> several security issues together in one release, they should be >>>>>> announced together. >>>>>> >>>>>> I might be missing something obvious, but there is no "if" or "maybe" or >>>>>> "it depends". Any module that has been 18 years with the project >>>>>> qualifies to be a "major module" to me... >>>>>> >>>>>> -Max >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List >>>>> sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org> >>>>> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >>>>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List >>>>> sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org> >>>>> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >>>>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List >>>> sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org> >>>> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >>>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List >>> sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org> >>> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >>> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users> >> -- >> Daniel-Constantin Mierla -- www.asipto.com <http://www.asipto.com/> >> www.twitter.com/miconda <http://www.twitter.com/miconda> -- >> www.linkedin.com/in/miconda <http://www.linkedin.com/in/miconda> >> Funding: https://www.paypal.me/dcmierla >> <https://www.paypal.me/dcmierla>_______________________________________________ >> Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List >> sr-users@lists.kamailio.org <mailto:sr-users@lists.kamailio.org> >> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >> <https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users> > _______________________________________________ > Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List > sr-users@lists.kamailio.org > https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
_______________________________________________ Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List sr-users@lists.kamailio.org https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
