[ On Wednesday, February 10, 1999 at 02:02:33 (+0100), Peter Svensson wrote: ]
> Subject: Re: transfering files back along an existing connection
>
> On Tue, 9 Feb 1999, Greg A. Woods wrote:
>
> > Go read Phrack #51 (the piece about hiding trojans from tripwire using a
> > hidden LKM) and then tell me how I'm going to trust an un-trusted host.
>
> And this is not relevant as I showed - you don't trust the untrusted host.
If you're using SSH or any other host-based network security package
then you *ARE* trusting the remote client hosts regardless of what you
may think and regardless of the type or style or implementation of
authentication that you use with SSH. Period. There are no "ifs ands
or buts" here.
> Please read what I and other have written before arguing that we don't
> read what you write. There are two basic advantages: automatic trust
> revocation after finishing the connection - we don't have to trust the
> client after we have logged out. A compromise then incurs no risk of
> compromise of the trusted system. The somewhat (understatement of the
> year, but anyway) smaller advantage is that with proper containment system
> on the trusted host a hackers activities will be limited in time even if
> the connection is compromised.
Automatic revocation of authentication keys (eg. effective one-time
passwords), which may or may not actually be true for an un-trusted
client host, is *ENTIRELY* different than *TRUST* that is placed in the
actual device used to initiate, manage, and close, the trusted
communications link.
> The client is irrelevant - it can be compromised all it wants to. It has
> no relevance on what I have written.
You have *NO* idea what you're talking about.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <robohack!woods>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
