URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/183
Title: #183: More socket-activation fixes

lslebodn commented:
"""
On (10/03/17 05:57), Jakub Hrozek wrote:
>On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 05:50:58AM -0800, fidencio wrote:
>> @sgallah, @lslebodn
>> 
>> On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Stephen Gallagher <notificati...@github.com
>> > wrote:
>> 
>> > @lslebodn <https://github.com/lslebodn>
>> >
>> > @sgallagher <https://github.com/sgallagher> The purpose of calling chown
>> > in ExecStartPre is to allow starting responders as non-privileged from
>> > beginning. Systemd drops permissions before exec.
>> >
>> > Yeah, I get that. And I told @fidencio <https://github.com/fidencio> on
>> > IRC that we can live with the TOCTOU for the time being and figure out a
>> > better option later. That said, we cannot use /usr/bin/chown for this,
>> > because it unconditionally calls getpwnam()/getpwuid() in its execution,
>> > which causes a problem when socket-activating. I suggested that we might
>> > want to just create a reduced-functionality /usr/libexec/sssd/sss_chown
>> > that calls only the low-level system function.
>> >
>> 
>> Well, considering we write our own sss_chown binary ... as we still don't
>> have a static uid for the sssd user we would end up calling
>> getpwnam()/getpwuid() for the unprivileged user.
>> 
>> In other others, it would solve the situation but only for the NSS
>> responder.
>> 
>> What I'm proposing is to take a step back and do *not* support unprivileged
>> users for socket-activated services for now. Get the socket-activation
>> working without cycle dependency on SSSD and avoid the TUCTOU issue.
>
>btw I think this is better instead of providing a hack because by
>default, even if the service is started explicitly in the [sssd]
>section, it runs as root. As long as we track switching to nonroot
>in the next release, I prefer running as root over adding hacks to the
>code.
>
sssd-nss runs as root by default.

We just need to remove chown from sssd-nss.service

LS

"""

See the full comment at 
https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/183#issuecomment-285723904
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