2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenb...@vsecurity.com>
commit 0d0138ebe24b94065580bd2601f8bb7eb6152f56 upstream.
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[a...@linux-foundation.org: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenb...@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <ch...@zankel.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <o...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <a...@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@suse.de>
---
arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *
elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs;
int ret = 0;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
#if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS
/* Flush all coprocessors before we overwrite them. */
coprocessor_flush_all(ti);
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