2.6.33-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenb...@vsecurity.com>
commit 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f upstream.
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenb...@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <r...@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <i...@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <matts...@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <a...@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@suse.de>
---
arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
- if (namelen > 32)
+ if (len > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, comman
down_read(&uts_sem);
res = sysinfo_table[offset];
len = strlen(res)+1;
- if (len > count)
+ if ((unsigned long)len > (unsigned long)count)
len = count;
if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
- if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
+ if (nbytes > sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1035,6 +1035,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, i
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
+ unsigned int status = 0;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
@@ -1043,13 +1044,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, i
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
- ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
+ ret = sys_wait4(pid, (unsigned int __user *) &status, options,
+ (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
+ err |= put_user(status, ustatus);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
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