2.6.33-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> commit 0d0138ebe24b94065580bd2601f8bb7eb6152f56 upstream. Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok() before copying data in. [[email protected]: s/EIO/EFAULT/] Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Zankel <[email protected]> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct * elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs; int ret = 0; + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t))) + return -EFAULT; + #if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS /* Flush all coprocessors before we overwrite them. */ coprocessor_flush_all(ti); _______________________________________________ stable mailing list [email protected] http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable
