[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
n 16 byte blocks on disk where data is encrypted ONLY with K1
      
The second block is already tweaked with I=1, making the encryption
dependent on K2. Only the 16-byte block with I=0 is encrypted alone
with K1, that is one 16-byte block per disk drive (or key scope). If
there are many drives using the same K1 key (which should not happen,
being bad practice), and an attacker knows which ones, and he has the
ability to put every one of them on a spin stand, then he can gain a
few plaintext/ciphertext pairs corresponding to the same, unknown key
K1. If AES was so weak that this few pairs presented some security
problems, we had to replace AES with something else, anyway.

Laszlo
  
Unless scoping restrictions are documented in the specification, you have to assume the worst case deployment for K1 and K2.  For worst case, I would assume that K1 applies to every disk drive deployed at the US Government, and that a different K2 is applied to every sector in every disk drive.

In all seriousness, I could see a unix-like environment where data is owned by multiple different users, and each user gets a unique K2 value.  Are you going to restrict the number of users who can store data to a disk?

mt

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