arch/ia64/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- arch/parisc/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h | 2 +- debian/changelog | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/compat.h | 2 ++ kernel/compat.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
New commits: commit bacb67b5b9bd1172562f501a6837617c838179ce Author: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]> Date: Thu Sep 23 12:12:48 2010 -0700 2.6.32-1+vyatta+42+larkspur11 commit a9c413b65f0584183517b6d491da1a4024eafcad Author: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Date: Tue Sep 7 16:16:18 2010 -0700 compat: Make compat_alloc_user_space() incorporate the access_ok() commit c41d68a513c71e35a14f66d71782d27a79a81ea6 upstream. compat_alloc_user_space() expects the caller to independently call access_ok() to verify the returned area. A missing call could introduce problems on some architectures. This patch incorporates the access_ok() check into compat_alloc_user_space() and also adds a sanity check on the length. The existing compat_alloc_user_space() implementations are renamed arch_compat_alloc_user_space() and are used as part of the implementation of the new global function. This patch assumes NULL will cause __get_user()/__put_user() to either fail or access userspace on all architectures. This should be followed by checking the return value of compat_access_user_space() for NULL in the callers, at which time the access_ok() in the callers can also be removed. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <[email protected]> Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]> Cc: Kyle McMartin <[email protected]> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> commit be199cdcf850f0509c88fbd3fd2595ed9593f6aa Author: Roland McGrath <[email protected]> Date: Tue Sep 14 12:22:58 2010 -0700 x86-64, compat: Retruncate rax after ia32 syscall entry tracing commit eefdca043e8391dcd719711716492063030b55ac upstream. In commit d4d6715, we reopened an old hole for a 64-bit ptracer touching a 32-bit tracee in system call entry. A %rax value set via ptrace at the entry tracing stop gets used whole as a 32-bit syscall number, while we only check the low 32 bits for validity. Fix it by truncating %rax back to 32 bits after syscall_trace_enter, in addition to testing the full 64 bits as has already been added. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> http://suva.vyatta.com/git/?p=linux-vyatta.git;a=commitdiff;h=bacb67b5b9bd1172562f501a6837617c838179ce http://suva.vyatta.com/git/?p=linux-vyatta.git;a=commitdiff;h=a9c413b65f0584183517b6d491da1a4024eafcad http://suva.vyatta.com/git/?p=linux-vyatta.git;a=commitdiff;h=be199cdcf850f0509c88fbd3fd2595ed9593f6aa _______________________________________________ svn mailing list [email protected] http://mailman.vyatta.com/mailman/listinfo/svn
