This is a reminder for:
Title: Folke Tersman, Uppsala University
Is Benacerraf's challenge a pseudo problem?
According to the central idea of Hartry Field's version of Benacerraf's
challenge against Platonism in mathematics, Platonism is not a viable
position if it excludes the possibility of explaining the reliability of
our mathematical beliefs in a reasonable way. This idea is supposed to
present a rather formidable problem for the Platonist given that Platonism
entails that our mathematical beliefs postulate entities that are mind- and
language-independent, causally inert, and bear no spatio-temporal relations
to us. Theorists in other areas, who advocate related positions (such as
non-naturalist versions of moral realism) are held to face similar problems.
It has recently been argued, however, that this alleged challenge doesn't
really amount to any challenge at all. The alleged reason is that it is
either trivial that a Platonist can offer an explanation of the relevant
type (in view of the necessity of mathematical facts) or question begging
or plainly unreasonable to assume that her principled inability to do so
weakens her position. My aim is to evaluate this criticism through
searching for an interpretation of what it means to "explain the
reliability" of our beliefs that allows us to reject all of the allegations
just mentioned. The conclusion is that, what we may come up with along
those lines at best makes the anti-Platonist argument the challenge gives
rise to rather weak. The argument has some weight, I claim, but is far from
a knock down objection.
When: Wed 10 Sep 2014 15:30 - 17:00 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: Muniment Room, Main Quad, University of Sydney
Calendar: Seminars
Who:
* Dalia Nassar- creator
Event details:
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