----- Original Message -----
From: "Chris Lonvick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Tom Petch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2006 3:33 AM
Subject: Re: [Syslog] Threat model requirements discussion


> Hi Tom,
>
> I see your points.  It appears that the section of RFC3411 that David
> Harrington sent around agrees with your analysis for SNMP.  However, as
> Baszi says, devices are using encryption for syslog for what is considered
> to be sensitive information when high levels of debugging are enabled.
> How would you address that?
>
> Thanks,
> Chris
>
Chris

I would not exclude encryption as a defence against message observation but
would give it a lower priority, my experience suggests a much lower priority,
than message origin authentication and integrity.  My concern is that we end up
with a solution whose complexity or cost makes it unsuitable for users whose
needs would be satisfied by a simpler one, namely authentication and integrity
without encryption - in technical terms, I see adding a keyed hash as more
attractive than deploying SSH or TLS etc

Any solution has some of the same issues - key distribution and maintenance -
but what I am mindful of is that this is an event/notification system (and
one-way at that) which reverses client and server roles compared to much of the
rest of systems management.  SNMPv3 solved this problem but in a way that users
found unacceptable to implement; isms and netconf have yet to solve it, we have
not yet begun to think about it.

So I want to see a simpler solution - eg keyed hash - first and a more complex
one which includes encryption as phase two (2007?).

And yes, my views are coloured by SNMP which I have worked with for many years,
where, as I have said before, users tell me they must have encryption but it
usually turns out they have not yet learnt about the concept of differing
threats.

Tom Petch

<snip>


_______________________________________________
Syslog mailing list
Syslog@lists.ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog

Reply via email to