below...
El 11/02/15 a las 06:04, Martin Thomson escribió:
On 10 February 2015 at 21:52, marcelo bagnulo braun <[email protected]> wrote:
C decides then to send a FIN (or a RST) with the expectation to force the
restart of the connection.
Unless peers are authenticated somehow, or peers are able to make some
sort of commitment to a key, then this seems like a plausible attack.
I guess that it falls under the "active" umbrella though.
but the potential concern here is that the attacker can choose for which
established connection he wants to disable the encryption and eavesdrop.
if you protect the FIN and the RST bit, even with unauthticated key, it
is not possible to do this once the DH exchange has ocurred.
I mean, if we protect the FIN and RST bit,s once the security
association between the endpoints has ocurred, an external attacker is
unable to disable the encryption, i believe.
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