marcelo bagnulo braun <[email protected]> writes: > but the potential concern here is that the attacker can choose for which > established connection he wants to disable the encryption and eavesdrop. > if you protect the FIN and the RST bit, even with unauthticated key, it > is not possible to do this once the DH exchange has ocurred. > > I mean, if we protect the FIN and RST bit,s once the security > association between the endpoints has ocurred, an external attacker is > unable to disable the encryption, i believe.
I agree, which is why I would like to see an option for protecting such metadata. I do think the FIN and RST should be considered separately, though, because FIN is easier to deal with and arguably worse. RST is potentially more controversial, so we would ideally have both options selectable by the administrator, default to something conservative but in the end let users and administrators vote with their configuration... David _______________________________________________ Tcpinc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc
