Hi Adam, > Am 09.11.2017 um 11:11 schrieb Adam Roach <a...@nostrum.com>: > > On 11/8/17 19:45, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF) wrote: >>> In one interpretation, the TCP stack acts as if those packets were never >>> received, and so they are never acknowledged. Since retransmissions will >>> contain the same contents and also fail to decrypt, this is basically just >>> going to cause a connection failure upon expiration of the retransmission >>> timer >>> -- in which case an immediate failure is clearly preferable. >>> >> That’s not true. This is to cover the case where the packet got corrupted on >> the path, thus hopefully the retransmission will decrypt correctly. > > > So, to be clear, you're talking about packet corruption that happens to > produce a valid checksum, right? If that's the reasoning here, the authors > probably want to include that rationale in the document. >
True. Actually I let the author jump in at this point to make sure they don’t have any other cases in mind. In any case it’s probably good to the explicitly as possible about these thing we know here. Thanks! Mirja _______________________________________________ Tcpinc mailing list Tcpinc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc
