-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > > Ok, perhaps I'm confused. Do you disagree with the later part - that > > Freenet/dark will no longer be dark if it grows? Or do you disagree with > > the conclusion - that not providing the functionality for its users as > > it grows means it "doesn't scale"? > > It may have to provide slightly different functionality for larger > numbers of users in hostile environments, if and as they become > increasingly hostile.
This doesn't make sense - its like saying Tor can provide high latency comm if it turns into mixminon. Yes, if you build a different system with different characteristics 2 years down the road, that different system will be different. The same folks behind Tor are behind mixminion (at least, to some degree), but that doesn't make them the same project. > I believe that it will offer means to hide its users. Initially by > being unharvestable, and then by simple steganography over > the internet (which can probably be detected by local traffic flow > analysis), and then by dropping real time delivery and using safer > steganography (which can probably be detected by semiglobal traffic flow > analysis), and finally by using non-internet transports. It may well be > possible for the state to defeat all of these mechanisms, but it will > cost them significant resources and time, and the system will be highly > useful in the meantime. And many semi-oppressive states (I would put > China in this category) won't bother. What part of the above couldn't apply to I2P? > They've only just got around to blocking freenet's session bytes this year! Yet they've already started blocking skype. (matter of economics) > > You've already agreed that both I2P and Freenet/dark offer essentially > > the same functionality in hostile regimes, including resistance to > > harvesting [1]. The only difference is that you believe "Freenet/dark > > will scale better". > > > > [1] http://dev.i2p.net/pipermail/i2p/2005-October/000975.html > > No, I haven't. Freenet/dark will allow a large darknet inside china with > a relatively number of external links. I2P/RR will allow a small darknet > attached to each link. Connolly said: "Thus, I2P 2.0 and Freenet 0.7 both offer the same restricted routing possibilities to Chinese dissenters." To which you replied: "Essentially yes." In the context of that email, there is no reason to constrain the 'B' subset to any particular size, to limit the 'A' subset to communicating with just one of those peers, or to limit the 'B' subset's interactions amongst each other. > The former is preferable for various reasons, the obvious one being > efficiency. Ok, so the essence of the difference is that you believe Freenet will be more efficient than I2P? That Freenet's routing will have less hops than I2P's O(1)? That Freenet will require less bandwidth overhead? You really believe that? > Additionally, freenet/dark can function in the absence of _ANY_ external > links. This is true, without using peers outside the adversary's region of influence, they'd have to have their own internal 'C' peers, which would likely be shut down. Though at the scale such a network would run at, the anonet thing would probably work fine. > Freenet/dark is a stego *network*. It just doesn't have any real stego > *transports* yet. If a pony sprouted wings, you'd have a flying pony, too. There is no evidence that stego transports will ever happen, or at least, happen anytime soon. There is neither any practice nor theory suggesting how they /could/ operate, which leads me to leave it to others researching in that field, rather than hoping someone will figure it out. I do look forward to hearing progress on such an effort, as it'd be really quite kickass to have a workable stego transport. But i'm not holding my breath. =jr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDTo6mWYfZ3rPnHH0RAtfmAJ9QUC6yRFzisTW59k85DPhInwyyqgCfSDsD WMIE1oNz1q/q5Bb/pCtM6FY= =XiN0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
