And in the meantime, they have a system which costs $10M to block (any time you have to involve politicians you get into big money, for a start), instead of $10K. This is bad how...?
On Wed, Oct 12, 2005 at 09:07:50PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote: > On Wed, Oct 12, 2005 at 03:57:59PM -0400, jrandom at i2p.net wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > > Apart from that... your argument is that you don't need global traffic > > > analysis to identify users, right? Well, probably this is true. You need > > > enough intelligence to see "hrrm, this user has VoIP connections to > > > these 5 other users 24x7... this doesn't seem very likely!". Right? > > > > Right. > > > > For Freenet/dark to have any sort of obscurity (aka to be different from > > Freenet/light), its traffic patterns need to be plausible and acceptable. > > > > Freenet/dark will still use long lasting bidirectional sessions, moving > > lots of data, right? What, other than p2p filesharing, looks anything > > like that? > > What is the situation with regards to conventional P2P in oppressive > regimes? Certainly piracy is tolerated... Presumably they attempt to > block P2P as they can't really run their own supernodes! OTOH, they > could probably just kill connections on seeing certain keywords in most > cases as most of them don't encrypt their connections...? > > In Europe, ISPs will soon be required to record VoIP contacts for future > analysis by law enforcement. I don't know if they expect to do this by > going to the VoIP companies themselves... surely some of them are out of > jurisdiction, and some of them are P2P. So presumably they will have to > do this via traffic analysis. Meaning that they probably have the > ability to do simple logging on any and all connections of specific > types asked for, in current hardware. Which could then be fed to a > government box, rather than just picking the required data out and > storing it, as will be required soon here... > > If we sacrifice real-time delivery, then we can make freenet traffic > look vaguely plausible, but it will still be between the same set of > peers. So it should be reasonably easy to build a back-end to find it, > over a longish period, say 6 months, based on traffic data kept... > > Which leaves us with sneakernet, wifi, schemes with PDAs and so on. > Which are much more difficult to set up and use, but are hard to find, > and can still scale into a usable-size network (I have previously > explained why I think scale is useful), using more or less the same > routing and structures as we will have in 0.7. So, even if 0.7 is not > usable as such in hostile regimes for long, it will function as a usable > prototype. > > Incidentally, your argument about small-scale systems slipping under the > RADAR is bogus. If the Chinese cared enough to take the above measures, > they would certainly be able to systematically block ordinary web > proxies (by scanning traffic for absolute URLs), rather than having the > current farcical situation of "the government is subscribed to the > proxies mailing list, so proxies get blocked in a day or so". Now, > perhaps this has already happened; I suspect Ian's info is way out of > date... > > Scale is useful for two reasons: > 1. You don't want to organize tiny groups of militants. They are quite > capable of using PGP. What you want to do is take free speech to the masses. > 2. The reason the internet is more useful than pre-internet AOL or an > old non-networked BBS is that it is global. > > > > =jr > -- > Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org > Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ > ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. > _______________________________________________ > Tech mailing list > Tech at freenetproject.org > http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech -- Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20051012/af310fba/attachment.pgp>
