On Saturday 01 March 2008 14:48, juergen urner wrote: > Matthew Toseland schrieb: > > > > We have to implement filtering because our threat model is completely > > different to that of the typical web browser. This explains why we implement > > filtering of HTML, and it explains why we warn the user on any type we can't > > filter - for example, mp3s can contain id3 tags, which might be interpreted > > by some players so you can click on the url to go to the song's author's > > homepage - or even as HTML. > > > I may watermark my mp3s.
Which is bad because...? The only threat here is that a download site may watermark each download of the same song differently in order to identify where the leak came from. There's nothing we can realistically do about that at the node level, but it's not a direct threat, certainly not to the downloader-of-the-mp3-from-freenet. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20080301/60505c2b/attachment.pgp>
