On Monday 09 January 2006 20:07, Charles Swiger wrote: > pool.ntp.org. 86400 IN NS ns1.us.bitnames.com. > pool.ntp.org. 86400 IN NS ns1.mailworx.net. > pool.ntp.org. 86400 IN NS usenet.net.nz. > pool.ntp.org. 86400 IN NS zbasel.fortytwo.ch. > pool.ntp.org. 86400 IN NS aventura.bhms-groep.nl. > > All five would have to be down before a significant problem would > happen, and even then other DNS servers would still have cached info...
Of course, if the primary is down, the zone file won't be regenerated anymore and some of the ntp servers in the rotation right at that moment might get traffic problems. I guess the only workable solution here would be to distribute the whole database and generate the zones locally on each nameserver. But having 5 different authoritative zones at any given time seems ... wrong. I think if we're starting to worry about this, we'd better face the fact that DNS is not the right tool for what we're trying to do, and start hacking ntpd *now*. cheers -- vbi -- OpenPGP encrypted mail welcome - my key: http://fortytwo.ch/gpg/92082481
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