Paul Smith wrote:
I personally don't really care that much whether or not Freud was a scientist - I care about which of his claims are supported and which are not.
I suspect we are, here, mostly in agreement that, under our current state of knowledge, Freud's explanations of various psychopathologies are no longer the best ones on offer. There is another interesting question, however, that I think lies at the root of the widespread animosity toward Freud -- whether he was *ever* engaged in a legitimate epistemic (to avoid the contentious term "scientific") project. Many act as though it is not enough to simply show Freud was simply wrong (they way, say, Hull was wrong), or even that he was foolish. They want to show, in addition, that he was something like "corrupt" as well -- that psychoanalysis was always closer to the flim-flam of, say, "neurolinguistic programming" than it was ever an honest attempt to get at the underlying causes of people's psychological troubles. I think the question about whether he should be referred to as a "scientist" touches on this matter more than on the matter of whether the findings of psychoanalysis should still be accepted today.
While I'm on this topic, I would like to suggest that simply discovering (and "exposing"!) examples of a person not having acted wholly within the confines of what we consider to be acceptable scientific practice does not, by itself, exclude them from having been a scientist. One can be both right *and* "cagey" (or even self-involved). The truth does not always "speak for itself." Historically, it has sometimes needed a little razzle-dazzle to get noticed. If you're interested, you might have a look at Paul Feyerabend's book, _Against Method_, in which he shows what a rhetorical "streetfighter" Galileo was, arguing WAY past his evidence at times (but no one would ever claim that Galileo wasn't a scientist on that basis alone). CAVEAT: Before someone goes after me for having recommended the work of Feyerabend, note that one needn't (and I, for one, don't) endorse his radical relativism to still be informed by his revisionist account of Galileo.
Regards, -- Christopher D. Green Department of Psychology York University Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 Canada
416-736-5115 ex. 66164 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.yorku.ca/christo
--- You are currently subscribed to tips as: [email protected] To unsubscribe send a blank email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
