In an earlier post, I wrote:
> > If this is true, then most of psychology is not science: whenever we
> > speak of mental events, we are speaking of something that does not
> > exist physically. No, science cannot be defined in terms of the
> > physical versus the nonphysical. I wish it were this simple.
And Bob Keefer responded:
> I don't follow your argument here; whenever -I- speak of 'mental events'
> I'm speaking either (1) as a shorthand for neural and chemical events in
> the body-mostly-brain, or (2) metaphorically, referring to as-yet
> sketchily understood physical events in the body-mostly-brain.
As I see it, we run into the levels-of-analysis problem here. (Again, I am not
a philosopher, but I do have some half-formed thoughts on the matter.)
Reductionism has been a goal of many scientists for decades. But the problem
is that higher levels of analysis don't necessarily (or often, or ever)
translate well into the terms of lower levels. For example, genes as defined
in Mendelian genetics (which are recognized by their gross effects on bodily
phenotypes) cannot be translated completely into genes as defined by molecular
genetics (which are defined in terms of transcription and translation and
other more fine-grained molecular events). My guess is that we will always
speak of mental events in ways that will not be completely translatable into
neural activity. Whether or not my guess will prove to be correct, I still
submit that you do not, at this time, use the term "mental events" as
short-hand for "physical events in the body." Instead, you use the term in the
same way as everybody else: as a label for something that occurs in something
we call the "mind." Whether or not we ever are able to translate this
completely into lower-level physical events is a question for the future. At
the present time, many psychologists are studying NONphysical entities such as
schemas, personality traits, and motivations. They are not using these terms
as shorthand for physiological events. They use them as psychological terms.
None of this means that we must fall back on a dualist philosophy. I still
believe (with you, Bob) that ultimately everything is the result of physical
processes even if I am not certain that we will be able to reduce mental
processes completely to physical processes. With regard to this issue, Dupr�
(to whom I referred in another post) stated: "The serious alternative to
reductionism is not Cartesian dualism, or a belief in ghosts, but a pluralism
that recognizes the equal ontological robustness of small simple things and
large complex things" (p. 44).
These are issues (i.e., reductionism and levels-of-analysis) of which I have
not thought much since I was a graduate student studying behavior genetics and
various definitions of genes over the last 70 years or so. It is a slight
which I plan on correcting in the near future.
Jeff
---
Jeffry P. Ricker, Ph.D. Office Phone: (480) 423-6213
9000 E. Chaparral Rd. FAX Number: (480) 423-6298
Psychology Department [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Scottsdale Community College
Scottsdale, AZ 85256-2626
"The truth is rare and never simple."
Oscar Wilde
"Science must begin with myths and with the criticism of myths"
Karl Popper
"If you want to learn new things, you should try reading old books."
Richard Cytowic
