> > Do we know how many protocols currently suffer from CRIME? > > > Maybe a best practice could be suggested by UTA for the implementation of TLS > in software, to disable compression if vulnerable. And for the others, to > implement a way to enable/disable compression in case one day a vulnerability > is found.
I agree. Again, 1) We know CRIME threat, but it can not be risk for everyone. e.g., CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.6 (LOW) 2) If we need to have comp/decomp in an application layer, clients such like browser need their own comp/decomp codes. 3) If there is no comp in tls1.3, some people may continue to use tls1.2. Which one is safer, "tls1.2" v.s. "tls1.3 with comp/decomp" ? That's why we explore the way to keep compression in TLSv1.3. How about making an option only in server-side? The spec has the compression but default is off, and also provides the suggestion. > > -- > Julien ÉLIE > > « La vraie valeur d'un homme se mesure lorsqu'il a tout perdu. » > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls ;; takamixhi saito c2xhYWlidHNvcw _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
