Scott, Henrick, Are you persuaded by Watson's analysis?
Thanks, -Ekr On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 7:41 AM, Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote: > On Tuesday 15 December 2015 20:01:58 Bill Frantz wrote: > > So we have to trade off the risks of too much data vs. the risks > > of a complex rekey protocol vs. the risks having the big data > > applications build new connections every 2**36 or so bytes. > > > > If we don't have rekeying, then the big data applications are > > the only ones at risk. If we do, it may be a wedge which can > > compromise all users. > > if the rekey doesn't allow the application to change authentication > tokens (as it now stands), then rekey is much more secure than > renegotiation was in TLS <= 1.2 > > so if we include rekeying in TLS, I'd suggest to set its limit to > something fairly low for dig data transfers, that is gigabytes, not > terabytes, otherwise we'll be introducing code that is simply not tested > for interoperability > > (with AES-NI you can easily transfer gigabytes in just few minutes) > -- > Regards, > Hubert Kario > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team > Web: www.cz.redhat.com > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >
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