‎Dear Eric,

Thank you for your comment - indeed, re-keying mechanisms based on secret state are widely used in the protocols (key trees are usual practice in ESP with GOSTs for more than 10 years, for example). My point is that a simple (e.g. without any additional keys or structures) and effective mechanism to increase ‎block cipher modes limitations on plaintext size can be helpful itself, without incorporating to a protocol. 

About connection with TLS 1.3 draft - for example, we don't want the GCM mode be defined inside some protocol RFC, it should be defined separately, isn't it?  So the question is that if such mechanisms are needed, than separate documents on them can be a better solution.

And my primary point here is about stateless techniques: as follows from t‎he preprint I cited before, the key lifetime for CTR can be increased quadratically, for example. 

Kindest regards,
Stanislav

От: Eric Rescorla
Отправлено: воскресенье, 28 августа 2016 г., 16:52
Кому: Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
Копия: c...@irtf.org; Mihir Bellare; Paul Lambert; Paterson, Kenny; Mike Hamburg; <tls@ietf.org>
Тема: Re: [TLS] Document on increasing the lifetime of session keys

Stanislav,

TLS 1.3 incorporates a rekeying mechanism (KeyUpdate) similar to that if Abdalla and Bellare 1(b).

-Ekr


On Sun, Aug 28, 2016 at 3:48 AM, Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev <smys...@gmail.com> wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Since there is a considerable interest to the question of increasing session keys lifetime (several productive off-the-list personal discussions about CryptoPro key meshing algorithms and http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/628 started after the Friday posting), maybe we should think about getting started a work on a document on efficient re-keying (about techniques without secret state and/or techniques with it (like in M. Abdalla and M. Bellare work, https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/rekey.html)) mechanisms for common cipher modes (CTR, CCM, GCM, CBC, CFB) in CFRG? 

If you consider it reasonable, we can prepare a first version of such a draft based on our results (both included in that our preprint and new ones which we are working on currently) before IETF 97 to be able to have a discussion on this issue there in Seoul.

Kindest regards,
Stanislav Smyshlyaev

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