On 09/07/17 07:23, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> Dismissing concerns with trivial and shallow analysis can serve to diminish
> the success of TLS1.3, because the users don't need to adopt it, and can
> end up blocking it and creating a failure of "TLS 1.3 doesn't work in XXX
> environments".

Over the last ~ year and a half, since these folks have
started openly bemoaning the lack of rsa key transport
in tls1.3, I'd guess there've been a few hundred messages
on the list on that topic alone. That is not dismissal,
that's having had more than a fair hearing. As you note,
it is entirely ok that they do not get what they want at
the end of that IMO extremely over-extended process.

Again, I would ask that the chairs chime in as to whether
they would like to see this distraction/discussion be
continued or stopped.

S.


Attachment: signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

Reply via email to