On 09/07/17 07:23, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote: > Dismissing concerns with trivial and shallow analysis can serve to diminish > the success of TLS1.3, because the users don't need to adopt it, and can > end up blocking it and creating a failure of "TLS 1.3 doesn't work in XXX > environments".
Over the last ~ year and a half, since these folks have started openly bemoaning the lack of rsa key transport in tls1.3, I'd guess there've been a few hundred messages on the list on that topic alone. That is not dismissal, that's having had more than a fair hearing. As you note, it is entirely ok that they do not get what they want at the end of that IMO extremely over-extended process. Again, I would ask that the chairs chime in as to whether they would like to see this distraction/discussion be continued or stopped. S.
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