On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com> wrote: > > >> So, I failed to convince you. However, you have also failed to > >> convince me that the proposal is wiretapping under the definition in > >> RFC 2804, Section 3. > > > > Consider SMTP/TLS. Where one MTA on the path supports this. > > Say it's one operated by an anti-spam company for example. > > That is clearly not the sender nor recipient. > > > > That meets all 4 points in 2804, right? > > You are pointing to email. Some MTAs will use SMTP over TLS, but many > others do not. It would be great if they all do, especially for the > authentication. In your response you are talking about an email system > that has been using plaintext for ages, and you are trying to apply > hop-by-hop a mechanism to the delivery. Then, you are saying that the > sender and receiver have confidentiality expectations that are being > violated. I do not buy it. >
It seems like a weak counterargument to say that because there remain areas where mail servers don't use TLS, that senders and receivers have no expectation of confidentiality with email at all. Are you really saying that if an MTA used this static-DH draft version of TLS to maintain keys to decrypt email traffic, despite it only being "intended" for enterprise use, that it wouldn't be wiretapping? What about if/when MTA STS[1] is implemented? Will MTA adoption have to hit 100% before it's suddenly wiretapping for any given MTA to surreptitiously use the static DH version of TLS that was "intended" only for enterprise use? -- Eric [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-06 > Russ > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone>
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