Back during the previous last call, I felt really guilty about bringing up
the 0-RTT stuff so late. Even though it turned out that middle boxes turned
out to be a bigger problem to deal with anyway, I just want to say that I'm
really grateful for the 0-RTT related changes in the document and for the
time and effort that went into all that. I think those changes are
sufficient to make a TLS1.3 implementation that handles 0-RTT in a
forward-secret, secure and safe way. The changes represent a good
compromise between having a secure state and supporting vendors who want to
be a bit more loose because their application environment can tolerate it
and forward secrecy is not as valuable to their users. Thanks especially to
ekr for inventing the fixes, for stewarding the clarifications, and for
being awesome about it.

At the same time, I just want to add a small note of caution to vendors; if
you're going to accept 0-RTT, trying to cut corners by tolerating replays -
even a little, is really likely to bite you! I've found even more examples
of application protocols and web protocols that implement transactions.
Also, if the secrecy of trillions and trillions of users web requests are
going to rest on how well session ticket encryption keys are managed,
protected, rotated and revoked, we really owe it to users to come up with
some collective guidance for vendors on how to do that well.


On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:10 PM, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> All,
>
> This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th.  This time the WGLC
> is for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/).
> This WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it only address changes introduced
> since the 2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e., changes introduced in versions -22
> and -23.  Note that the editor has kindly included a change log in s1.2 and
> the datatracker can also produce diffs (https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?
> url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21&url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23).  In general,
> we are considering all other material to have WG consensus, so only
> critical issues should be raised about that material at this time.
>
> Cheers,
>
> spt
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



-- 
Colm
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