Hi Colm, Thanks for your note. This seems straightforward to handle before IETF-LC.
Maybe something like: "Note: many application layer protocols implicitly assume that replays are handled at lower levels. Tailure to observe these precautions may exposes your application to serious risks which are difficult to assess without a thorough top-to-bottom analysis of the application stack"? -Ekr On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 12:15 PM, Colm MacCárthaigh <c...@allcosts.net> wrote: > > Back during the previous last call, I felt really guilty about bringing up > the 0-RTT stuff so late. Even though it turned out that middle boxes turned > out to be a bigger problem to deal with anyway, I just want to say that I'm > really grateful for the 0-RTT related changes in the document and for the > time and effort that went into all that. I think those changes are > sufficient to make a TLS1.3 implementation that handles 0-RTT in a > forward-secret, secure and safe way. The changes represent a good > compromise between having a secure state and supporting vendors who want to > be a bit more loose because their application environment can tolerate it > and forward secrecy is not as valuable to their users. Thanks especially to > ekr for inventing the fixes, for stewarding the clarifications, and for > being awesome about it. > > At the same time, I just want to add a small note of caution to vendors; > if you're going to accept 0-RTT, trying to cut corners by tolerating > replays - even a little, is really likely to bite you! I've found even more > examples of application protocols and web protocols that implement > transactions. Also, if the secrecy of trillions and trillions of users web > requests are going to rest on how well session ticket encryption keys are > managed, protected, rotated and revoked, we really owe it to users to come > up with some collective guidance for vendors on how to do that well. > > > On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:10 PM, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> wrote: > >> All, >> >> This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for >> draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th. This time the WGLC >> is for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ >> doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/). This WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it >> only address changes introduced since the 2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e., >> changes introduced in versions -22 and -23. Note that the editor has >> kindly included a change log in s1.2 and the datatracker can also produce >> diffs (https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21&u >> rl2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23). In general, we are considering all other >> material to have WG consensus, so only critical issues should be raised >> about that material at this time. >> >> Cheers, >> >> spt >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > > > > -- > Colm > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >
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