On Thu, Apr 23, 2020, at 11:24, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 4:54 PM Martin Thomson <m...@lowentropy.net> wrote:
> > I prefer Ekr's solution, but I would go with that being a recommendation 
> > (SHOULD) as opposed to a requirement (MUST).
> 
> Can you clarify where you think we should say SHOULD?

The security considerations seems right.  After the list of improvements over 
DTLS 1.2 CID.  You would say that an endpoint that is asked to provide a CID 
SHOULD provide one in every record (with the compact header, etc...).  If it 
does not, then it might be possible for an attacker to use that record to 
confirm guesses about linkability between two paths.  Also, omitting the CID 
might make it hard to route datagrams.

With all of this, you might want a section heading for all the CID stuff.

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