#22210: circuit_is_acceptable is slow due to IP and fingerprint parsing ------------------------------+-------------------------------- Reporter: teor | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.2.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.8.12 Severity: Normal | Keywords: tor-hs Actual Points: | Parent ID: Points: 1 | Reviewer: Sponsor: | ------------------------------+-------------------------------- (I received this bug report from special. Please feel free to contact me (teor) with questions.)
Using Tor version 0.3.1.0-alpha-dev (git-04f1ddaa2a33194b), also applies to at least all 0.2.8.x and above. Testcase is a ricochet client with a very large number of contacts. Effectively, it’s a client that attempts to build circuits to >100 <500 hidden services almost simultaneously, and retries over time with increasing delays. This tor client will constantly use 100% of a CPU core for >15 minutes after start. There’s a variety of buggy behavior going on, and a lot of circuits, so it’s not entirely surprising to see some high load. More interesting is where that load actually comes from. The vast majority of CPU time — 2.1 minutes out of a 3 minute trace — is spent under `circuit_is_acceptable`, as called from `connection_ap_attach_pending` (via `circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch` and `circuit_get_best`). The breakdown from there is: 2.10 min 100.0% 6.26 s circuit_is_acceptable 58.93 s 46.7% 1.05 s tor_addr_parse 56.34 s 44.7% 1.84 s tor_inet_pton 52.53 s 41.7% 1.68 s tor_inet_aton 50.71 s 40.2% 914.00 ms tor_sscanf 49.74 s 39.4% 13.78 s tor_vsscanf 29.30 s 23.2% 20.11 s scan_unsigned 5.29 s 4.2% 5.29 s TOR_ISDIGIT 1.13 s 0.8% 1.13 s digit_to_num 43.76 s 34.7% 1.30 s connection_ap_can_use_exit 39.51 s 31.3% 574.00 ms node_get_by_nickname 38.93 s 30.9% 764.00 ms node_get_by_hex_id 23.82 s 18.9% 869.00 ms hex_digest_nickname_decode 21.61 s 17.1% 10.95 s base16_decode 10.07 s 7.9% 10.07 s hex_decode_digit_ 14.32 s 11.3% 156.00 ms node_get_by_id 16.39 s 13.0% 1.47 s build_state_get_exit_node 14.93 s 11.8% 119.00 ms node_get_by_id That is super hard to read in this format, but essentially a majority of time is spent on: 1. Parsing IP addresses from strings out of node descriptors 2. Looking up nodes by ID 3. Decoding hex digests to get node IDs This implies to me that these could be cached in a much more useful way in the node struct, the algorithmic complexity of some of the circuit selection functions is out of control, and I’m also guessing that the circuit attach functions are being called __way__ too often. Without circuit_is_acceptable being considered, the hottest path is under choose_good_middle_server for node selection, which seems much more reasonable. The profile quoted here had —enable-expensive-hardening (including ASAN) and slightly older tor, but I’ve rerun with 04f1ddaa and without hardening with the same conclusions, including 2 out of 3 minutes of CPU time being spent under `circuit_is_acceptable`. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22210> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs