#21642: Prop275: Eliminate "published" times from microdescriptor consensus ------------------------------------------------+-------------------------- Reporter: nickm | Owner: nickm Type: enhancement | Status: | merge_ready Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | 0.3.1.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: TorCoreTeam201703, review-group-17 | Actual Points: .5 Parent ID: | Points: 2 Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor4 ------------------------------------------------+--------------------------
Comment (by arma): Thoughts: A) I think the patch in prop275_minimal_029 is safe and fine. B) Check out in mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old() how we decide to republish our descriptor if our consensus entry says our descriptor is more than 18 hours old (#3327): {{{ else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff) retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old"; }}} So if we do the next step, which would be setting the timestamp to 2037 or whatever, we will disable this hack. Are we still using the hack much? I think we added it because we have a bunch of subtle bugs where relays forget to republish, or where relays *do* republish but the dir auths drop their newly published descriptor because it's too similar to the last one. I don't think we found or fixed those bugs. At first I thought "hey, no problem, relays cache both flavors of consensus, because directory_caches_dir_info is so lenient." But then I realized that in the above code snippet, the rs is gotten from networkstatus_get_latest_consensus(), which will be the microdesc consensus. So I have resumed thinking that if we set published_on to always 2037, we will be disabling this hack. :( -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21642#comment:16> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs