#15621: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire. ---------------------------------------+----------------------------------- Reporter: yawning | Owner: dgoulet Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: Component: Core Tor/Tor | 0.2.9.x-final Severity: Normal | Version: Keywords: tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201604 | Resolution: Parent ID: #6418 | Actual Points: Reviewer: asn | Points: small | Sponsor: SponsorR-can ---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------
Comment (by nickm): Ack on NM1...NM2. I think that for NM3, you're right, but we should add a tor_fragile_assert() there to make intent more clear. (Or even tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached().) For NM4, the fingerprinting issue: The case I'm worried about is where we learn that an HS upgraded at the same time that some other view of the HS upgraded. (eg, it's being used as a client too, and they're trying to keep the client identity separate from the HS identity, but both changes are observable.) Am I being too paranoid here? -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15621#comment:19> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs