#15621: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire. ---------------------------------------+----------------------------------- Reporter: yawning | Owner: dgoulet Type: enhancement | Status: needs_information Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: Component: Core Tor/Tor | 0.2.9.x-final Severity: Normal | Version: Keywords: tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201604 | Resolution: Parent ID: #6418 | Actual Points: Reviewer: asn | Points: small | Sponsor: SponsorR-can ---------------------------------------+----------------------------------- Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: needs_review => needs_information Comment: Replying to [comment:19 nickm]: > Ack on NM1...NM2. I think that for NM3, you're right, but we should add a tor_fragile_assert() there to make intent more clear. (Or even tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached().) > Yup. I see that as a refactoring also since this could imply to drop that intro version handler array because it's unused but we could actually make it useful also. > For NM4, the fingerprinting issue: The case I'm worried about is where we learn that an HS upgraded at the same time that some other view of the HS upgraded. (eg, it's being used as a client too, and they're trying to keep the client identity separate from the HS identity, but both changes are observable.) Am I being too paranoid here? > Hrm... so yes, it's somehow a possibility. I'm unsure how you can tell if a client has also upgraded to 029+ thus correlate but if there is a way, it's a tiny bit possible. Middle ground here. arma proposed to merge this patch only when 224 gets in so we do one big transition. If we are OK with that, for which I'm ok with, let's push this ticket to 0.2.??? (224 won't be in until 0.2.10/0.3.0 imo)? -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15621#comment:20> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs