> On 3 Jan 2016, at 12:18, Ryan Carboni <rya...@gmail.com> wrote: > > And yet the NSA is moving to prime numbers. > > A large public key isn't a very good reason to not adopt quantum-safe crypto, > it just means that it requires having the Tor project to be able to scale to > a larger degree. I suggest hash tables, a percentage of which are > pseudorandomly downloaded. Otherwise the Tor project won't scale to 10x the > relays ... even ignoring quantum cryptography.
We had a GSOC project to produce "consensus diffs", so that clients could download the differences between each consensus each hour, rather than downloading a full consensus (~1.5MB). It showed some great results, but still needs a little work before we merge it. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13339 <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13339> Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F
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