Am 17.09.2017 01:56 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 11:44:41PM +0000, dawuud wrote:
> Your only option would be to ask your ISP to uncensor the internet,
> unfortunately. Tor requires that all relays are able to contact all
> other relays, and those which cannot participate in the network.
I think you meant to say:
"Tor requires that all relays are able to contact all directory
authorities"
Actually, no, we want it to be the case that all relays can reach all
relays. The less true that becomes -- that is, the less clique-like
the network topology becomes -- the more complicated the anonymity
measurements become, and that is potentially quite bad.
What if the relay operator knows about her connectivity issues /
censorship
and reflects that in her exit policy?
I thought that this would be best practice in such a case, and would not
hurt anonymity. (I don't know why :)
Tor certainly does NOT require all relays can contact all relays. In
fact, the network is *very* partitioned... but as of the past few
months I haven't put any energy into proving this; although I do have
some mostly finished twisted python code to make all two hop tor
circuits and records circuit build failures and circuit build
timeouts.
This is a great research area that it would be good to see some
attention for.
In particular, if there are specific relays that are doing especially
poorly for connectivity, we should work with them to try to get them to
fix it, and if it's unfixable, downgrade their weights and/or boot them
from the network.
See also
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12131
("Measure connectivity patterns between relays")
and
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19068
("Write and run a clique reachability test")
--Roger
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