On Mon, 3 Oct 2011 21:39:46 +0400 unknown <unkn...@pgpru.com> wrote: > We talk about it day ago on some web-resource. Possible with you personally > :-) > > Linux provided system Tor-daemon seems more secure then tor started from user. > > I propose next steps but concern about any "Gotcha!" here: > > 1) Download, check gnupg signatures and unpack tor-browser. > > Keep system Tor-daemon from deb-package > http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org with carefully settings including > your transparent firewalling. > > 2) Activate plug-ins (HTTPS-Everywhere, NoScipt, TorButton) with copying: > > cp -r ../tor-browser_en-US/Data/profile/extensions/* > ../tor-browser_en-US/App/Firefox/extensions > > (or use symlinks). > > 3) Don't run Bundle start script, ignore vidalia and tor from bundle. > > Run '../tor-browser_en-US/App/Firefox/firefox' directly. Check that plugins > is working and you use system tor correctly without leaking information (Use > Torstatus check sites, local sniffers). > > 4) Don't use vidalia. Use 'sudo killall -SIGHUP tor' instead of vidalia > newnym control-port command. And restart your tor-browser after that newnym. > > Any comments? >
Everything works OK before tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-2.2.33-3-dev-en-US.tar.gz in Debian stable Now I can't use Tor-browser directly that way described above: >WARNING: Application calling GLX 1.3 function "glXCreatePixmap" when GLX 1.3 >is >+not supported! This is an application bug! > >failed to create drawable start-tor-browser script from TBB itself works correct but using tor tunneling from system tor-daemon with Linux transparent firewalling torifycation double increased tor overhead. Using Tor with users permissions instead of debian-tor daemon is not a best way for secure integration with a system too. Is it version developed especially for enforcing use TBB as is? _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk