Pretty sure there's be more collisions in regard to those yes or not questions than you think. Distribution of temperaments and opinions seem to fit a bell curve. Thus the number of collisions would be quite high.
In terms of internet plug-ins, a person would customize their computer in terms of how well they understand computers. Thus the low-end would have malware and the high end would have unique plug-ins, programs, and fonts that serve their interests. Joe Btfsplk writes: > > > I'm no expert on fine details of this, but over a long time of > > checking TBB, Firefox, JonDo Fox, etc., on multiple test sites, it's > > always clear that far more info is available when JS is enabled. > > The EFF says ~ 33 bits of identifying info (ii) are needed to > > accurately identify the same browser / machine at multiple sites. > > Strictly speaking, the 33 bits figure refers to identifying a _person_, > and comes from Arvind Narayanan, who calculated it by rounding down the > base 2 logarithm of the world's human population. (If you can ask > 33 perfectly independent and identically distributed yes-or-no questions > about a person, the set of answers to those questions will be completely > unique.) > > There are probably fewer Internet-connected browser instances than > living people, so less information might suffice to distinguish them. > > If you're using EFF's Panopticlick page, you should be aware of some > limitations about the measurements it gives you. One is that it doesn't > measure all possible measurable attributes of a browser -- people doing > user tracking may have additional measurement techniques that aren't > included in Panopticlick. Another is that the "bits" of information > that you get from measuring each attribute don't actually add linearly > (and there's no direct way of adding them without knowing more about > the population statistics and how the attributes interact). So if you > get an estimate that your Foo browser feature contributes 6 bits of > identifiability and your Bar browser features contributes 5 bits, you > can't necessarily conclude that together they contribute 11 bits. > (Another limitation that Peter Eckersley, the developer of Panopticlick, > pointed out to me is that the sample of fingerprints in Panopticlick's > database isn't very current or very representative of a larger population > of user-agents that are getting used in 2014.) > > You're definitely right that Javascript is an important part of many > browser fingerprinting techniques and that browser fingerprinting will > work much less well without it. > > -- > Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> > Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ > Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join > 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk