I myself have been making solar powered servers running tor, and have built a CMS vi-chan derivative which publishes .torrents for the bittorrent maelstrom browser.
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 9:56 AM, s7r <s...@sky-ip.org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > Hi Donncha, > > Your idea is indeed very interesting. I am eager to see it in > practice. If you have the time, me and TheCthulhu (cc'ed) could > provide the infrastructure and necessary system administration hours > to test this. > > While your current solution is a way to use load balancing and > redundancy, which means spreading the resource usage over multiple > machines, checkout my questions about maximizing a single HS server as > close as possible to its total capacity: > > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-March/037173.html > > Please email directly if you want to start this, we will document each > step and share the results with everyone here. Maybe this will give > some hints for writing a proposal for load balancing and high capacity > hidden services which could be merged with the proposal of second > generation hidden services. > > On 3/12/2015 3:22 PM, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote: > > > > > > On 11/03/15 17:40, George Kadianakis wrote: > >> MacLemon <t...@maclemon.at> writes: > >> > >>> Hoi! > >>> > >>> I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high > >>> availability” hidden services. Mostly pertaining to web servers > >>> serving large-ish static files. (Let's say 5-100MB each.) > >>> > >>> Load balanced as in not all requests end up at the same box to > >>> speed up downloads. High availability as in the service is > >>> still available if one box goes down or is taken offline for > >>> maintenance. > >>> > >>> So, not exactly your usual distributed-cluster setup. > >>> > >>> > >>> From what I understand it would not make sense to run the same > >>> HS Key on multiple boxes since the descriptors would overwrite > >>> each other every few minutes. > >>> > >>> I don't think one can do something like Round-Robin DNS with > >>> HS. > >>> > >>> So the only way I can imagine this to work is a central > >>> redirection node that know about all the nodes and more or less > >>> intelligently/randomly 302 redirects each file request to a > >>> known-to-it server. > >>> > >>> This still leaves a single-point-of-failure in form of the > >>> redirection server but would at least distribute the traffic > >>> load across multiple servers and cope for nodes coming and > >>> going. > >>> > >>> Has anyone done something like this? > >>> > >> > >> An application-layer load balancer like HAProxy might be able to > >> help you. > >> > >> Unfortunately, there is not something equivalent to DNS Round > >> Robin for hidden services yet. There are some ideas on how to do > >> this on the Introduction Point-layer, but a proposal still needs > >> to be written. For further reading: > >> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-April/006788.html > >> > >> > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-May/006812.html > >> > > > > I've been thinking a little about this problem. It seems like one > > simple solution would be to find a way of combining the > > descriptors/introduction points from multiple Tor HS instances into > > one hidden service descriptor from which the client can pick intro > > points at random. > > > > To implement such a solution like that, there needs to be a means > > for the hidden service instances to communicate with other. They > > can then either selected a common set of intro points or combine > > the individual sets of intro points selected by each instance. > > > > In one straight forward implementation a hidden service operator > > could set up a Tor relay and a hidden service on each of their > > load-balancing nodes. These load balancing hidden services SHOULD > > have different hidden service keys and could use stealth > > authentication for privacy (so that their introduction points are > > encrypted). > > > > A management server would contain the actual hidden service key > > but would not need to run any hidden services. The role of the > > management server would be to regularly fetch descriptors for the > > load-balancing hidden services, combine the introduction points > > into a single descriptor for the hidden service which is then > > published as normal. > > > > After the signature on the hidden service descriptor is verified > > there is the hidden service protocol doesn't user the permanent > > key/onion address. As such there is no need for each of the relays > > to have a copy of the hidden service key. > > > > I think this provides a couple of advantages: > > > > - The hidden service key only needs to be in one place. The > > machine holding the key would generate very little traffic and > > would not be locatable by the publically known hidden service > > attacks. > > > > - The hidden service key could be stored encrypted on the > > management server. > > > > - If any of the load balancing relays are compromised an operator > > simply needs to stop including its introduction points in the > > descriptor. This should minimise the need to 'revoke' hidden > > service keys. > > > > The number of introduction points in a HS descriptor is currently > > limited to 10 in Tor. This sets a limit on the number of > > load-balancing nodes that could be deployed at present. > > > > This approach doesn't require any changes to the Tor code base at > > all. I hope to implement a management server in the next few weeks > > to test how this works in practice. > > > > It would be great to get any feedback about this proposal! > > > > Regards, Donncha > > > > > > > > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVAcU7AAoJEIN/pSyBJlsRPfQH/2e9sdD+7Vhh1l7DMImJo7/Q > uPaU7T7pOXEbNhrzS3hvsGyPfuNK1fKuKXoLCFq8Dx+hM0S1ciyo6OJ456wqtg3E > DO1bFivBxA+/y/CvY51Kz4kssZ0sNOc4GOejw1HB7pHw8sKLzZvTKQcPJIBY+ome > 5sN6Twy3y1B9rzPQNEJFJYb8FtmUOlQZvr08yzm7VCB7dJFx5cNr72m+xbTnSoRY > s+heUFmuu9lU+YOBkin+NpkmsQ32knQg1y8H4MJBgOdb59mopWah2BSI6wJC0RXy > arBjeMoP2xsLWV6qIpCKLGn1mX34q5eLLFyYf6kgcHIG94z+6/+XByywjDdZx0U= > =+dvW > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk