Jeremy Rand writes: > It's theoretically possible to use naming systems like Namecoin to > specify TLS fingerprints for connections to Tor hidden services, which > would eliminate the need for a CA. I'm hoping to have a proof of > concept of such functionality soon.
Is there a way to prevent an attacker from simply claiming the same identifier in Namecoin before the actual hidden service operator does? -- Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk