2001 AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision
Theoretic Agents
March 26 -28, 2001, Stanford University, California
Description:
Over the last few years game and decision theories have proved to be
powerful tools with which to design autonomous agents, and to
understand interactions in systems composed of many such agents.
Decision theory has been adopted as a paradigm for designing agents
that can handle the uncertainty of any moderately complex environment,
and act rationally to achieve their goals. Game theory, building on
the assumption that agents are rational and self-interested, has been
employed in the design of mechanisms and protocols for interaction,
coordination, communication, negotiation, coalition formation, fair
voting techniques, market-based resource management systems, and
industrial-scale information economies. Further, interesting recent
results have been reported on the issue of mechanism and protocol
design for bounded rational agents.
As a result, there is be much to be gained from bringing together
researchers interested in game theory and decision theory to present
recent work on the applications of these techniques in the
construction of agents and agent systems, and to discuss the
cross-over between these fields.
Submission information:
Submissions are due on October 9, 2000.
Please submit the abstract and the main body of the paper via
http://matisse.uta.edu/GTDT2001.
Topics of interest:
We solicit papers dealing with, but not limited to, the following
areas:
* Descriptions of agent systems employing game theory or decision
theory;
* Empirical evaluations of agent systems employing game
theory or decision theory;
* Theoretical developments in game theory or decision theory
applied to agent systems;
* Position statements about the use of game theory or decision
theory in agent systems.
Descriptions of deployed systems are welcome. We are also interested
in the use of non-standard variants of decision theory (including
qualitative and logical approaches), and in approaches that combine
decision and game theories.
Organizers:
Piotr Gmytrasiewicz, CSE Department University of Texas at
Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019-0015. Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Simon Parsons, Department of Computer Science, Chadwick
Building, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZF, United
Kingdom. Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Program Committee:
Cristina Biccheri (Carnegie Mellon University)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Craig Boutilier (University of Toronto)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jon Doyle (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Amy Greenwald (Brown University)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jeff Kephart (IBM Institute for Advanced Research)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sarit Kraus (Bar-Ilan University)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Martha Pollack (University of Michigan)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Richard E. Stearns (University of Albany)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Wynn Stirling (Brigham Young University)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Gerald Tesauro (IBM Watson Research Center)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Leon van der Torre (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Russell Vane (Litton PRC)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Michael Wooldridge (University of Liverpool)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Shlomo Zilberstein (University of Massachusetts)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Piotr Gmytrasiewicz
CSE Department
Univ. of Texas at Arlington
Arlington, TX 76019-0015
(voice) (817) 272-3334
(fax) (817) 272-3784
http://www-cse.uta.edu/~piotr/piotr.html
