2009/2/14 Vincenzo Ciancia <cian...@di.unipi.it>: > On 14/02/2009 Felipe Figueiredo wrote: >> As others said, more than once in this thread, the change is >> reversible. >> There will be a package to install so you don't have to edit your >> xorg.conf. > > I will keep myself informed but I expected that ubuntu-devel-discuss was > also a place to discuss the ubuntu development, involving high-impact > changes. My mistake, so I will keep myself informed. > > However, it seems to me that nobody is getting the point about fake > login screens: if I am an *user* of somebody else's network, how can I > protect myself from another *user* faking a login screen, used as the > only running X application, and stealing my password?
You have evidence that such scenario could happen or even is happened? Or you just speculate? Anything can be faked in this world, specially on computers. > Under some windows versions, I can use ctrl+alt+delete. I bet the mac > has something similar, Nope, it doesn't (as far as I know, and I have worked with OS X as sysadmin for five years). And Windows Ctrl+Alt+Delete have absolutely different meaning than anti-faking measure. > and Xorg traditionally had ctrl+alt+backspace > (even though, it also kills the session as a nice side effect). Now, you > have to consider that even an experienced system administrator may not > notice the change when he will install next ubuntu on the client > machines of a computing lab, or even worse when upgrading to it. Fancy > an unexperienced system administrator as there are many. Well, unexperienced system administrator would allow box to contain trojan to get your password anyway. Believe me, faking login screens is not a way someone would steal your password, unless there is no other way. > I will surely write my own fake gdm as an exercise just in case I become > an user of such an admin :) Because of statistics, you know, if I carry > a bomb there can't be another bomb on my plane. Strawman argument. > If the solution is "currently, ubuntu jaunty is vulnerable to this > problem", let's just admit it and make it public in the release notes at > least. So that people will know and avoid leaving the default > configuration on clients. No, Jaunty simply won't have C-A-B feature enabled by default. Simple as that. Release notes doesn't have such speculation as "OMG, visual interface have changed, someone could use it to steal information from people". > Personally I would love that the power button returned to gdm, and that > gdm created a new X session (like for the "guest login" use case) for > every login, without disappearing, and occupying a fixed tty (the one > the power button would return to). In that case, gdm could also offer a > pre-loaded and not-swappable emergency shell that administrator may > access. However, this *really* needs a blueprint so for now is there any > other solution? > Yes, this *really* need blueprint just for a reason - it is how world-shattering changes are introduced into Ubuntu. Disabling C-A-B by default was blueprint for two years. This is how decision making happens. Don't get me wrong - I know that changing features is painful process of some of us, but as far as I have experienced with Ubuntu, it is always pays back in long term. Introduction of compiz broken a lot of setups, but Hardy released with nice desktop effects tested for some time. NetworkManager 0.7 was introduced as main network configuration tool. Sure, I was annoyed, even angry. But I took time to test it and understand it and now I admit that it is a future. There is a blueprint already for dealing with C-A-B without disabling it and I hope it will find a way into Jaunty+1. And that is how system should work. Cheers, Peter. -- Ubuntu-devel-discuss mailing list Ubuntu-devel-discuss@lists.ubuntu.com Modify settings or unsubscribe at: https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-devel-discuss
