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Subject: ugnet_: [abujaNig] A CASE ON UGANDA UNDER NRM
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 18:57:07 -0400
Africa Direct Publications Uganda: how Britain is helping to recolonise Africa Barry Crawford, May 1994.
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Contents
1. When democracy means recolonisation 2. How Britain helped to rig the Ugandan elections 3. Uganda: from colonisation to recolonisation
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When democracy means recolonisation
The debate about bringing democracy to Africa is really a discussion about recolonising the continent, argues Barry Crawford.
When the Cold War ended, a new 'conditionality' was imposed on Africa by the Western powers. It was variously described as 'good governance', 'transparency' and democracy. Warren Christopher, the US secretary of state, described the West's new policy towards Africa as a step forward from the old Cold War relations: 'During the long Cold War period, policies towards Africa were often determined not by how they affected Africa, but by what advantage they brought to Washington or Moscow.' Christopher promised that the Clinton administration would make a clean break. Henceforth 'an enduring commitment to democracy and human rights' would be the hallmark of America's relations with Africa (Economist, 29 May 1993).
However it was presented, the new policy of bringing democracy and human rights to Africa reflected a new assertiveness in the West's dealings with the continent. Seizing upon its ideological victory over communism, the West took the moral high ground and lectured Africa about responsible government. In all the discussions about the courrupt and despotic nature of African governments, the West's record of backing Africa's worst despots was largely overlooked.
Stalinism was not the only casualty of the end of the Cold War. African socialism and the politics of African liberation were also discredited. This has prevented resistance to the imposition of Western austerity programmes from having any clear political expression. Having endured economic stagnation during the 'lost decade' of the eighties, most African politicians were all too aware of the social costs that austerity programmes entailed. Yet the absence of any alternative strategies prevented opposition to the programmes from acquiring any political momentum. The Western powers were in a position to renegotiate their relations with Africa on terms even more favourable to themselves. It is in this cotext that the African democracy debate must be seen.
The constituent assembly elections held in Uganda on 28 March 1994 consolidated power in the hands of Yoweri Museveni's ruling organisation, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Britain and the other Western powers are happy to pay lip-srvice to the merits of Museveni's 'no party' or 'movement' democracy. Museveni boasts about having the full backing of the American and British governments for his version of democracy. Museveni has said that his government is under 'no pressure whatsoever and will continue to receive aid and assistance from Western donors' (Minutes of security meeting held in State House, Entebbe, 26 September 1992).
Museveni is a favoured African leader of the nineties. Edward Clay, the British High Commissioner in Uganda, sang the country's praises in the run-up to the March 1994 elections:
'In 1990 when Douglas Hurd....first talked about good governance, he mentioned Uganda as a case in point, a pretty example, where greater efforts are being made in an evolutionary way, which we approve, to improve the standard of government, to try to make government responsible to the wishes and interests of the people who are governed and try to involve the people in the process of government...We have already made known that we will help with some the of the cost of the elections. we have said Britain will provide ballot papers which will be done according to the requirement of the [constituent assembley] commission. We will support that. For the moment, it's not for us to choose for Ugandans what mode of elections to follow.' (Sunday Vision, 21 November 1993)
Yet the political process underway in Uganda gives the lie to Western claims that democracy and 'transparency' are the cornerstones of their policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War period (see 'How Britain helped rig the Ugandan elections'). Western sponsorship of African leaders is not determined by a commitment to foster democracy in Africa. Rather, it is all about establishing a new set of client relationships, since the old ones have been rendered obsolete with the passing of the Cod War.
As long as Western interests are being prioritised, any form of government will do. High Commissioner Clay can say that it is not for Britain to dictate to Ugandans what mode of elections to follow, but Britain has already adopted president Museveni as its man in Uganda. This has nothing to do with Museveni's commitment to democracy and everything to do with the fact that he has proved willing to force through crippling austerity measures in the name of structural adjustment programmes, and has the military capacity to enforce order in the face of the sharply deteriorating living standards which have resulted.
Uganda's subordination to Western diktat is becoming ever more pronounced, three decades after Uganda won its independence from Britain. Of course, the end of colonialism did not free Uganda from foreign intervention. The constitutional arrangements which Britain instituted at Uganda's independence in 1962 frustrated the development of a nationalist programme and a coherent Ugandan state.
Although Britain considered Milton Obote, the nationalist leader, to be a moderate, it sought to place constraints upon his ability to advance any form of African socialism which might threaten British interests. The preservation of the institution of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, was intended to serve as a moderating influence upon the nationalists, since the authority of the Kabaka rested upon old ties of kinship and upheld arrangements which were rooted partly in African custom, and partly in colonial practices. By getting nationalist agreement on a federal form of government which respected these arrangements in Buganda, the scope of Ugandan nationalism was restricted.
The federal arrangement, along with Uganda's narrow economic base, gave rise to instability from the outset. Tensions between the nationalists and the Kabaka poisoned Ugandan politics. By 1966 the situation became untenable and resulted in Obote siezing state power and abolishing the federation. His subsequent nationalisation measures put his government on a collision course with Britain. Obote's 'Left Turn' placed him on the wrong side of the Cold War divide, and subsequent British backing for Idi Amin's military coup came as no surprise. Amin's loyalty to Britain had been tried and tested in Kenya, where he had fought the anti-colonial liberation movement, the Mau Mau.
Yet Amin in turn was also compelled to nationalise to preserve the economy. By that time his regime had become an embarrassment to Britain. It took eight years and the deaths of some 300 000 people before the rule of Amin was brought to an end. Attempts at bringing about civilian government fianally gave rise to the re-election of Obote, in late 1980. While the second Obote administration received British support, Museveni's dissident army received British contacts from as early as 1984. By the time his forces entered Kampala and seized power in 1986, it was assured of British backing. British recognition for Museveni's military government was immediate. For the second time, Britain had backed a military takeover in Uganda.
British backing for Museveni has been substantial. The civil service is trained largely with British assistance. Britain initiated a rehabilitation project at the Institute of Public Administration in Kampala in 1989, at a reported cost of �400 000. In March 1990, the British minister for overseas development, Lynda Chalker, officiated at the opening of the first phase of the project and announced a further �450 000 grant for the project's completion (New Vision, 9 March 1990).
Museveini rewarded Britain by selling off state assets at knockdown prices. In July 1992, the government released a list of over 100 enterprises due for immediate privitisation. Before doing so at hime, the government advertised the affected enterprises in the foreign media, in particular the London Guardian. It also secretly sold companies without tendering. The Agricultural Enterprises, together with its six subsidiaries, was sold for $7.6m - although the value of its assets was put at $36m. The government also agreed to take over responsibility for the company's debts which amounted to $4.2m. Kampala has become a haven for foreign investors who are rushing in to make a quick killing.
The sound economic management with which the Western powers credit Museveni is lost on the swelling numbers of unemployed Ugandans. Between June and September 1992, over 1000 senior and middle level officer posts in the civil service were axed. All told, a total of 60 000 men an women got the chop. Thy have to look for work in the miniscule private sector or go to till land in the villages.
Meanwhile Museveni has continued to mortgage Uganda to foreigners. The Kampala International Hotel is now in the hands of Sheraton, and the East African Steel Corporation at Jinja is leased to a Taiwanese company for an annual $100 000 - 'chicken-feed', as some commentators put it (New African, September 1992)
Toeing the Western line has only impoverished Uganda further. When Museveni seized power in 1986, Uganda ranked as the twelfth poorest country, with a per capita income of $230. A structural adjustment plan, instigated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, was implemented the following year. By 1993 Uganda ranked as the wold's fourth poorest country (after Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia) with a per capita income of $170.
Uganda's export earnings were $466m in 1986; by June 1992 they stood at $177m. Uganda's debt rose from $1.2 billion in 1985, to $2.7 billion in 1992. Yet foreign donors have stood behind Museveni. In 1991, foreign aid accounted for 86 per cent of government spending. An Oxfam report of December 1993 presented the situation in stark figures. Social welfare indicators are among the worst in Africa. Infant mortlity is 118 per thousand live births. The introduction of user-fees in the health sector has resulted in falling hospital attendence and a consequent rise in mortality. Increased fees for education and inadequate public investment in schools has led to a crisis in education, with an increasing number of children - especially young girls - being withdrawn ('Mutilateral debt as an obstacle to recovery: the case of Uganda', paper prepared for European NGO Meeting on mutilateral debt, The Hague, 4 December 1993). Meanwhile, military spending continued to grow. The World Bank estimates that it constituted at least 53 per cent of total government spending in 1992.
Alongside his compliance with Western economic prescriptions, Museveni has revived the debate around the restoration of the various historic kingdoms of Uganda. The ceremonial coronation of Ronald Mutebi as the thirty- sixth Kabaka of Buganda took place in July 1993. While the king has no formal political power, the revival of the institituion is likely to set a precedent and mark a revival of 'traditionalist' as opposed to nationalist politics. This is very much in line with contemporary Western thinking about Africa, which blames much of Africa's economic failures and political instability on African nationalism, and favours a return to traditionalism.
Western intervention in Uganda, spearheaded by Britain, has reduced Uganda to a Western client state. The Ugandan people are having to pay a high price for the implementation of the austerity measures demanded by Western institiutions. As Museveni's compliance with these programmes earns him stronger Western backing, so the abrogation of Uganda's sovereignty continues.
How Britain helped rig the Ugandan elections
The British government boasts about its role in helping Uganda along the road to democracy. Barry Crawford asks what gives Britain the right to lecture Uganda about democracy?
The British government has praised Uganda's constituent assembly elections, held on 28 March 1994, as the fairest in Uganda's hisory and a major step towards democracy. President Yoweri Museveni's 'no-party' democracy, in which political parties are banned, has been given the British seal of approval as a serious attempt to achieve political progress and transcend the tribal and regional divisions which are said to have plagued Uganda since independence in 1962. Britain has presented itself as a supportive, though non-interventionist, player in Uganda's democratic awakening.
But what is Britain doing interfering in the democratic process of a sovereign state? What gives British politicians the right to lecture Ugandans about 'good governance' and democracy? Imagine the uproar there would be if a group of African politicians took it upon themselves to advise the British about how to manage their governmental crises.
The suggestion that democracy has been advanced by one iota in Uganda thanks to Britain's tutorship is laughable. Behind the sham of democratic elections, Britain is overseeing the consolidation of a military dictatorship and the prostration of Uganda before the West.
The elections may have been 'free' in the most technical sense of the word. But they offered little choice to Ugandans. The 'no-party' arrangement was designed to stifle political debate. There was never any doubt that Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) would be returned to power.
The elections were a fraud. But they were praised by the British government, which has been a strong supporter of Museveni's government ever since it seized power in 1986. Britain is an unashamed apologist for the 'no- party' system, and presented the constituent assembly elections as an important stage in a process of creating representative government. By providing ballot boxes and helping foot the bill for the elections, Britain's role has boosted the international standing of the NRM. Britain's backing has given legititimacy to a regime which few Ugandans support. Museveni's men shot their way to power in 1986, six years after starting a guerrilla war against an elected government. In the 1980 election which brought Milton Obote to power, Museveni's party had won just one seat. Museveni himself came a poor third in the constituency he contested. Nevertheless, it appears that Britain developed close ties with Museveni as early as 1984 when he was still a dissident guerrilla leader.
Once in power, Museveni recieved immediate recognition from Britain, and has basked in the warm glow of British approval ever since. He has proved to the Western powers that he is their man. Socialist rhetoric notwithstanding, Museveni has complied to the letter with the terms given by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. His willingness to go further still down the austerity road in the post-Cold War nineties has sealed this relationship with the West.
The process of removing political parties from debate dates back to the toppling of Milton Obote's government in a military coup0 led by Brigadier Basilio Okello on 27 July 1985. Okello was ousted in turn by Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986. Opposition parties were restricted and later banned as the 'Aims of the Revoultion' proclaimed:
'The establishment by force, if necessary, of a one-party "popular democracy" in Uganda....democracy is to be defined at all times solely by the National Resistance Movement and the high command of the National Resistance Army....only NRM is allowed to operate in the country such that the other political parties, ie, UPC, DP, CP and NLP will cease to exist as required by the revolution.' (Quoted in Uganda Peoples Front/Army Open letter, June 1989, Document No 12)
During the first six years in office, Museveni consolidated his power by waging war upon dissident forces and repressing all opponents. The NRA numbers 300 000 men. According to a United Nations report, Uganda's military expenditure in relation to human development is the third highest in the world, behind Iraq and Iran.
The assault upon political parties was wide-ranging. The regions of the north and east of the country were strongly opposed to Museveni. The defeat of dissident armies and the subjugation of the civilian population was achieved through a brutal 'pacification' programme. Indiscriminate massacres were conducted by the NRA in Gulu district in October and November 1988. During July 1989, a scorched earth policy was implemented by the special brigade mobile forces of the 80th battalion under Major Katagara in the districts of Kumi and Soroti. Several hundred villagers were butchered.
In one incident at Kumi, 60 youths were crammed into rail wagons and died. Their deaths were put down by various witnesses as either suffocation or incineration. The commander of the army, Major General Salim Saleh publically apologised to the people for the incident but went on to say that this admission was in itself 'a clear manifestation and democracy by the NRM government'. In fact, Salim Saleh could openly admit to the killing because Museveni had no intention of bringing those responsible to trial, having blamed the atrocities on the rebels who 'were hiding among the population' (New African, November 1989).
In order to crush dissident forces, the authorities issued leaflets to villagers instructing them to evacuate their homes and move to resettlement camps. Their food stocks were destroyed. Those who refused to move were presumed to be dissidents and were liable to be shot on sight. In an inteview with Caroline Lamwaka of New Vision, Museveni spelled out the strategy:
'It is precisely because of what we insisted on, this separation of law-abiding citizens from those who happen to be bandits. Therefore, people who were opposing us on this issue were actually murderers of civlians. Because they wanted civilians to be killed'.
[Lamwaka] 'On the issue of evacuating the population?'
[Museveni] 'Yes, on the evacuation policy. So those who are opposing us are actual enemies of the population whether they know it or they don't know, whether they are conscious or not, or whether they are aware or not aware. The end result of the position of opposing our evauation plan was actually to have the population killed accidentally or even sometimes by design by some undisciplined elements.'(27 June 1989)
In Kasese district alone, around 120 000 villagers were evacuated (New Vision 23 February 1990). Operation Pacification resulted in over 700 deaths in the north. Commenting on this, the minister of state for defence, Major General Tinyefunza, was uncontrite:
'The NRA took few captives in battles because most of them were simply sent to heaven....I would not mind killing 700 or 7000 if they behaved in such [a] manner as to become military targets.' (Citizen, No 45, 22 May 1991)
Museveni himself has bragged about NRA massacres, as after a slaughter at Corner Kilak:
'The rebels attacked us [NRA soldiers] at a place called Corner Kilak, 20 miles south of Kitgum town. They came in wild, singing and shouting. Our people massacred those chaps. They approached our troops frontally. This gave us a very good chance because they exposed themselves; on Sunday [January 14 1987] we surrounded them and massacred them. We masacred them very badly.' (The Standard, 21 January 1987)
The dissident movements, with the exception of the Lord's Resistance Army, have all been defeated. In the process, civilian populations suffered terrible abuses. The NRA is reported to be the worst culprit. There are widespread reports of NRA looting, torture, abduction and rape in villages in regions where dissidents were pursued. Fear of the NRA has prevented villagers from cultivating their lands. In the area east of the Nile, this has resulted in the worst famine since independence (The People, 14 October 1992). In November 1990, a helicopter crashed at Kitgum town barracks; it had been overloaded with bags of simsim, the local staple, confiscated from villagers as part of an NRA scorched earth policy (Weekly Topic, 11 January 1991).
In addition to waging war against dissidents, harsh repression has been meted out to unarmed political opponents. At a public meeting in Kitgum, the district attorney presing over the meetin took offence at a contribution from a civilian in the audience. After the meeting the civilian was beaten unconscious by the district attorney's bodyguards. (The Monitor, 11- 15 February 1994).
Reports of atrocities in Gulu emerged in the wake of the NRA's 'panda- gari' operation. Some 18 northern political leaders, including Democratic Party organising secretary Zachary Olum, were arrested and severely tortured. Major General Tinyefunza, commander of the operation and minister of state for defence, said that the leaders were arrested for preaching political pluralism in their home areas (The Citizen, 29 May 1991). In January 1992 the party's secretary general, and its national publicity secretary were put on trial for treason. When the DP threatened to hold an illegal rally in May 1993, Museveni responded, saying: 'If they want to see dead bodies, let them go ahead with the rally.' (Daily Nation, Nairobi, 8 May 1993)
Next in the firing line was the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), the one-time ruling party of Milton Obote. The party's assistant secretary general and 16 other officials were arrested and detained in January 1992. By issuing treason charges against political opponents, the regime was able to institute detention without trial for 15 months. Over 100 people were detained in this manner in the first quarter of 1991, according to a Ugandan human rights report (The Citizen, 29 May 1991).
There are also accounts of NRA hit squads. Before the former secretary of the Uganda Airlines Association, Ochieng Odoi Osenge, was able to implicate the government in using the airline to run South African arms to Croatia, he was shot dead by unknown white gunmen. NRA officers appeared suddenly from nowhere an took his body. Soldiers prevented an independent autopsy and ten cemented the body into the ground, so preventing a funeral (New African, August 1992).
The press has not escaped either. A cabinet minute of 1990 is instructive: 'It was now clear that the government had to take ruthless measures to cean up the field of journalism, and to ensure that Ugandan jounalists grasped the tenets of national aspirations....we will not tolerate any journalist insulting or ridiculing the National Resistance Army (NRA) for whatever reason.' (Minute 40, 'Freedom of the press', third meeting of the Ugandan cabinet held on 1 February1990)
Editors of Uganda Confidential, the Citizen, the Guide, Economy, and Mulungera were all arrested and charged with various offences (New African, April 1992). In August 1993, the government alleged that privately owned newspapers published government secrets, and directed all government departments and parastatals to withhold advertisements from the private press. The Commissioner to the constituent assembly, Stephen Akabwai, said he will be 'giving marks to the stories' written about the constituent assembly (Weekly Topic, 27 August 1993)
The local government elections of March 1992, indicated the kind of democracy Museveni had in mind. Apart from arresting and charging opponents with treason, other restrictive practices were implemented. Instead of a secret ballot, voters were made to queue up behind their chosen candidate, thereby exposing themselves to harassment. The candidates themselves were not allowed to campaign, and had to leave election gatherings before presentations about them could be made. Despite all this, the Ugandan people still managed to express their party political allegiances.
The Constitutional Commission presented a draft constitution to Museveni on 31 Secember 1992. Predictably, it recommended suspending party activity for at least another seven years after which tim a referendum would be held on the issue. Once elected, the constituent assembly would open a constitutional debate in which multi-party democracy would be considered. Yet the framework within which the recent constituent assmbly elections were conducted left nothing to chance.
The demarcation of electoral constituencies was rigged to favour the NRA. Museveni appointed an old schoolmate of his, Stephen Akabwai, as electoral commissioner, empowered to demarcate constituencies and supervise the whole electoral process. He took all of three weeks to demarcate 214 new constituencies. Opposition figures accused him of under-representing areas where opposition parties enjoy support, such as the densely populated Bushenyi, Masaka and Mbale districts. The 137 737 voters in county Nakifuma, in Eastern Iganga, were all in one constituency. In the western district of Rukungiri, there was boundary shifting, allegedly to reduce opposition to Amama Mbabazi, Museveni's right-hand man. All opposition candidates in Mwenge county were set to eliminate each other, having been lumped in one constituency.
Despite this, the Ugandan electorate produced a verdict which may prove problematic for the NRM. Official figures gave 144 of the 214 seats to the NRM. (While candidates stood as individuals and were not permitted to state party affiliation, the candidates indicated whether or not they supported a 'movement system' as opposed to multi-partyism.) There are an additional 74 seats requied to make up the full complement of the constituent assembly. Of these, Museveni is entitled to nominate 10 personally, while the NRA is to nominate 10 more.
The NRM has gained the numbers to win the arguments, but not the consesnsus it needs to justify its aim of abolishing other political parties. Some 85 per cent of Uganda's seven million registered voters turned out to select the individuals offered. In the north and north-east, NRM candidates did very badly. Nearly three quarters of existing parliamentarians lost. Betty Bigombe, the notorious Minister for Pacification Resident in the North, was beaten into third place.
Aside from the defeats of prominent NRM figures, the NRM had failed to achieve its central objective - the destruction of the opposition parties. The NRM's losses were to a large extent the UPC's gains. The UPC has re-emerged as a credible organisation. Ugandans also used their vote to discredit the government's economic policies - Museveni's whole economic team was rejected, including the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance. Furthermore, the assertion that 'no-party democracy' is needed to transcend tribal and regional allegiances looks hollow, since the elections have exposed a deepening of the divide between the southern and western regions on the one hand, and the northern and eastern regions on the other.
In fact, tribal thinking resides at the top of the NRM, as evidenced by Museveni himself:
'I know the weakness of every tribe in Uganda....the Acholi are like sheep being prepared for slaughter. They are so ignorant that even if you put a knife on their throat, they will not believe that you will kill them....The only difference between the Acholi and the Baganda is that the former are not thieves and liars.' (Minutes of security meeting held in State House, Entebbe, 26 September 1992)
Uganda Confidential, a government mouthpiece, echoes this tribal thinking: 'Great tribes like the Baganda thrive by assimilating other people from other inferior tribes, while inferior tribes diminish because of this lack of scientific vision and instead keep in shrinking isolation....Similarly superior cultures of people like the Banyarwanda....thrive because of their ability to modernise just like the Japanese, Chinese, etc.' (6-11 April 1994) Museveni just happens to be from the Banyarwanda tribe.
Meanwhile, Britain has become an international public relations voice for Museveni. The Foreign Office is only too keen to put a moderating gloss over reports which expose the undemocratic and reppressive nature of the regime:
'Under president Museveni, however, while sporadic abuses have come to light, in general the situation has taken a substantial turn for the better. We believe Museveni personally is committed to a full restoration of human rights and a democratic government in which all views can be freely and peacefully expressed. Britain's aid programme has reflected this improvenent; our aid is designed to reconstruct the Ugandan economy, devastated by so many years of civil war. It is also directed at areas which are essential if the state is to be fully rehabilitated, such as the police, the judiciary and the civil service. We have also helped the Constitutional Commission which is working to construct an appropriate democratic constitution for the country.' (Letter from H Elliot, East African Department, Foreign Office, 3 July 1990)
Referring to a letter from a Ugandan exile in London, whose mother was burned to death by Museveni's forces, Baroness Chalker offered her defence of Museveni:
'While it is true that the Acholi suffered victimisation at various times during the Obote and Amin regimes, this is not the case under the NRM. The current director of army intelligence, for example, is himself an Acholi and the north and east of Uganda can no longer be described as rebel- affected areas. While both soldiers and civilians do indulge in rape and robberies, the penalties are severe, and especially so for soldiers who not infrequently are sentenced to death if guilty of robbery with a weapon. The fundamental problem suffered by Uganda's population today is economic, which is the result of the economic destruction caused the by preceding regimes. AIDS is also a serious problem.... The progress of Uganda to a full plural democracy has still some way to go but we will continue to do what we can to encourage the process and to let president Museveni know if we have any misgivings. He can be in no doubt about our determination to support those countries striving for sound economic management and pursuing good government policies.' (Letter to Brian Sedgemore MP, 20 December 1993)
According to Douglas Hurd, multi-partyism is alive and well in Museveni's one-party state:
'Political parties have not been banned in Uganda, although their activities have been constrained for some time....faced with increased party political activity earlier this year, the National Resistance Council passed a resolution to give legal form to the informal understanding which limits such activity. We and other lobbied strongly against this, and the enacting bill has not yet been tabled.'
And so too is respect for human rights:
'There is no doubt that abuses still occur. But we believe the Ugandan government is genuinely committed to maintaining better standards, and the situation has improved. The insurgency is all but over and the National Resistance Army is handing over responsibility for law and order to the police. Military expenditure is down, and plans are under way for a large-scale demobilisation of National Resistance Army soldiers, to which the World Bank and donors (including the UK) are contributing. (Uganda Democratic Coalition Newsletter, Nov/Dec 1992)
Ugandans seeking refugee status in Britain have been refused on the grounds that Museveni has proclaimed an amnesty for exiles. The return of the former oppostion figure, Otema Alimadi, was used to show that Ugandan exiles had nothing to fear. Yet Museveni withdrew the amnesty on 12 April 1988 and Britain continued to deport exiles to Uganda, as Apire Okot was to find out. He was deported and immediately arrested upon his arrival in Uganda. He was driven to his home village, accused of being sent to Uganda to spy for dissidents, tied up, beaten and left for dead by the NRA. Since the implementation of the British Asylum and Refugees Act in mid-1993, 170 Ugandan asylum-seekers have been refused recognition.
Far from aiding the democratic process in Uganda, British interference is the main obstacle to the Ugandan people realising their aspiration for democracy. For the British government, any form of government will do in Uganda so long as its interests are served. When Britain talks about bringing democracy to Uganda, what it really means is bringing Africa under Western diktat.
The Mulindwas Communication Group "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" Groupe de communication Mulindwas "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"
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