Ch. 7 Uganda: The Immediate Causes of the Revolution (pp. 135)
a. The Exposure of Clandestine Involvement in a Foreign Conflict
b. Accusations of Profiteering from the Conflict
c. The Likely removal of Idi Amin and Its Consequences
d. The UPC Stand on Ochieng’s Motion
e. The Constitution and Its Restraints
f. The Seizure of Absolute Power – subsection: The Gold Inquiry
g. The Unrestrained Executive and Its Effect on National Unity – subsections:
(i) Power Over Security Matters;
(ii) Power Over Legislation;
(iii) Control of Local Government;
(iv) Self-Perpetuation in Office;
(v) Abolition of Kingship;
(vi) Powers Denied;
(vii) Other Aspects of Over-Centralized Authority
h. The 1971 Coup D’etat – subsections:
(i) Immediate Reasons;
(ii) Basic Causes;
(iii) The Absence of Elections;
{An aside: Among the many writings of on Amin’s 1971 coup d’etat; John Agami’s 1977 book, The Roots of Political Crisis in Uganda and an article in the Washington Post of February 24, 1978 are particularly notable in being well informed. Agami, a Lugbara, was in the Uganda army and saw events first-hand. Pro-Obote Acholis need to read this book carefully to see how they were manipulated & hood-winked and effectively “tarred” by Obote. In his bid for absolute power, Obote also “tarred” the Baganda. In some ways, Acholi is still suffering from Obote’s cynical manouver – as witnessed by “Kony” and the fact that a great many Acholis have only know life as inhabitalt of Museveni’s “Protected Villages” as IDPs (“Internally Displaced Persons”), a fat
e the share with the Baganda of Obote’s infamous “Luwero Triangle”}
“On 4 February 1967, a KY member of the opposition, Daudi Ocheng, moved a motion in parliament, which Obote’s manouvers had postponed for a year. Ocheng charged him with having used the arm to support the insurgents in the Congolese civil war and in the process having enriched himself with looted gold, ivory and coffee.
“In addition, there was another charge made by Ocheng that the prime minister with his two ministers were using the then deputy commander of the army, Colonel Idi Amin, to make arrangements to to seize power and abrogate the Independence Consititution.
“This was the most serious parliamentary censure in Obote’s nine years in power, not only because of the gravity of the charges but also because of the overwhelming support with which parliament endorsed the motion, demanding the suspension of Colonel Idi Amin, and instituting investigations in to these allegations.
“Why did Obote react by suspending the constitution, giving Amin command of the army, and assuming sweeping presidential powers? Was it, as he claimed, to save the country from chaos, from a group of neotraditionalists who were formenting trouble in order to seize power? Or was it because the Ocheng motion, with its possible damaging disclosures, heralded possible fall from power by a popular vote he was not prepared to countenance (sic)?
“Given the basic fact that he had long resolved to remain in power at all costs (original emphasis) and that he had conditioned the army and police to support this end, any serious move to challenge or censure his leadership had to be eliminated by persuation if possible and by force if necessary. The Ocheng motion could not be stopped by party or parliamentary maneuvers. Its adverse consequences, therefore, had to be preempted by force and in the process Obote would seize absolute power to ensure once and for all time that none would ever seriously challenge him again – neither through the party, the legislature, nor the electorate. This was at the heart of the events that followed the Ocheng motion that essentially had posed these basic threats to him.
THE EXPOSURE OF CLANDESTINE INVOLVEMENT IN A FOREIGN CONFLICT
“In his first official report to the UPC delegates conference of 1968, in which he detailed why he seized power, Obote extensively argued that whatever support he had given to the secessionists of Eastern Congo (Zaire) in the civil war was authorized by the party and the Cabinet, that such aid was within the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)1. He never said a thing about the secret, illicit extent of the Uganda army’s involvement in the fighting inside the Congo and that it was this that had caused Uganda to be attacked by Conolese mercenaries and army, both by land and air.
Towards the end of 1964, the situation along the Congo frontier was becoming serious. Often, Uganda was being attacked without fully understanding the reasons why. There had been a civil war in the Sudan in the North and in Rwanda in the South, both along Uganda’s borders and involving the influx of tens of thousands of refugees, but none had created comparable tension. Officially, the information the UPC organs and the Cabinet received on the developments in the Congo was scanty and purposely distorted by Obote in order to obtain his pre-determined results – support for government action or condemnation of the Congolese government and its allies.
“Although there were a few who supported an open recognition of the Staneyville regime of Gbenye opposing the Congolese central government, there was a consistent majority in all UPC and parliamentary group meetings that opposed any physical intervention by Uganda, instead advocating a a search for a way to resolve the civil war through a political (as opposed to a military) settlement under OAU auspices. Obote outwardly supported this view and sent delegations to attend OAU meetings on the matter to seek a political settlement.
“Ostensibly in order to handle problems arising from the influx of Congolese refugees, Obote setup a committee of four persons: the ministers of defense and community development, felix Onama and Adoko Nekyon, and the deputy commander of the army, Idi Amin, as members, and himself as chairman. Only these four men were “to deal with the dual problem of refugees from the Congo and the security of Uganda.” The persons picked had been his right-hand men in ethnicizing the security forces. From now on, the Cabinet and the UPC became effectively isolated from the Congo problem.
“On 13 January 1965, Gbenye met Obote and Presidents Kenyatta and Nyerere in Uganda and agreed to seek a political solution to the civil war. There was absolutely no decision or agreement to support the Stanleyville regime by military means on an East African basis.
“Despite the isolation of the party and Cabinet from the truth, disturbing reports quietly began to pour in from the frontier district of West Nile. Credible information from eyewitnesses indicated a steady build-up of arms being ferried into the Congo from Uganda. At times, mysterious aircraft brought armaments and landed unannounced on airstrips in northwest Uganda. Obviously Uganda could note promote a political settlement by fueling the military conflict. What was worse, however, was the active involvement of the Ugandan army in the fighting. Acting under Obote’s direct orders, a section of the Ugandan army was fighting side by side with the insurgents hundreds of miles kilometers inside the Congo on se
veral occassions.
“On 10 February 1965 the Congolese government gave an ultimatum to Uganda to pull out its forces or face a military conflict. Obote predictably denied any involvement. Yet, actual fighting was under the direction of a committee headed by him, though under the operational control of Idi Amin, and training was provided for the rebel troops withing the Ugandan borders and inside the Congo.
“Life in the west Nile district became most insecure as armed Congolese insurgents spread fear and lawlessness among Ugandans. Naturally, members of Parliament from the are, with direct and daily access to what was happening, protested vigorously in Parliament for protection with little avail.
“It was against this background that aircraft of the Congolese air force, probably operated by mercenaries, bombed two frontier towns of Goli and Phaida in the west Nile district around 16 february 1965. There was an outburst of rage in the country and urgest questions had to be answered. Why of all Congo’s neighbors was Uganda to be bombed and attacked by the Congolese armed forces?
“As usual, Obote had to misdirect public attention by shifting the nation’s wrath to the United States, which was admittedly the prime backer of the Congolese government. The United States, it was alleged – probably rightly – had provided the combat aircraft to the Congo and therefore was ultimately responsible for the attack on Uganda on 16 February 1965. A national demonstration was held against the American embassay in Kampala where the American flag was burned. Yet, this did not answer the question of why Uganda was attacked.
1 This was his elaborate “political and constitutional report” to the UPC Annual Delegates Conference held in 1968 at Mbale.
2 Uganda Parliamentary Debates 45 (28 May 1965): 1919
3 Ibid., 46 (3 June 1965): 2090.
4 Quoted by G. Oda in Ibid. 42 (10 March 1965): 1312
5. Uganda Parliamentary Debates 58 (4 February 1966): 1014 (also in Transition that I posted here sometime ago – js)
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