Hi,

On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Dianne Skoll <d...@roaringpenguin.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 24 Feb 2017 18:07:50 +0000
> RW <rwmailli...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> > OK.  Any FPs, though?  That's the other half of the test.
>
>> No, but it's pretty unlikely there would be.
>
> Actually, it's very likely there will be a lot of FPs, but it's also
> very likely that any given user of the list won't see them.  That's
> because when someone's email address gets compromised and then the
> system administrator clears it up, the only recipients to suffer
> false-positives are those with whom the sender would normally
> correspond.
>
> We have seen a few of these cases happen.

We've actually had false-positives due to how the list is built into
rules. In other words, "i...@ca.com" is still on the list from 2011.
They're also not bounded by default, so noi...@ca.com and
morei...@ca.com would also be caught, for example.

>> It seems like a lot of hassle for little benefit.
>
> The APER doesn't catch all that much, nor do the known-phishing URLs catch
> much, but every little bit helps.

How do you build the phishing URLs list into rules similar to how the
addresses2spamassassin.pl does for the phishing emails?

> As a data point, one of our installations scanned 4 million messages
> yesterday.  Of those, only 262 hit our known-phishing URL list (which
> uses APER and additional sources) and 155 hit APER's known-phishing
> email address list.
>
> But maybe those few hundred were really worth stopping because they
> prevented phishing attacks.  Who knows?

The phishing_emails file builds almost 1100 meta rules. Is there a
point where it's too many and affects processing? I mean, of course
there's a point, but does 1100 plus all others approach that on any
reasonable system?

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