On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 11:56:21PM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote: > > Aaron, > > > > There's a group of folks from M3AAWG that are working toward a sort of > > mechanism for SMTP, roughly using some ideas relating to HSTS and/or > > certificate transparency. The idea being that you would specify a published > > policy where a sender can see that you expect that sessions will be > > encrypted, and report TLS failures to the receiving system (without TLS). > > I think you're talking about smtp-sts.
Yes, that's the document. It still needs some work, but it can be a stop-gap for the larger providers while they gear up to implement DNSSEC (a few years work). > And I also think I've broken your proposal in this GitHub issue: > https://github.com/mrisher/smtp-sts/issues/1 No. Neither DEEP nor TACK can protect MTA-to-MTA SMTP. The reason is MX indirection. DEEP and TACK pin server properties, not domain properties. The MITM will just forge the MX RRset and bypass DEEP and TACK. In any case, there are domains to which I send email very infrequently, but still want the transport to be secure, none of DEEP, TACK or STS address that. -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ Uta mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
