> On 06 May 2016, at 02:28, Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]> wrote: > > The MITM attacker already knows he was attempting to intercept the > traffic.
The MITM does, the receiving party may not. >>> The SMTP message would be sent via opportunistic TLS, with fallback >>> to cleartext if STARTTLS fails or is not advertised. >> >> See above. Opportunistic TLS is the wrong approach here in my opinion. I >> never liked it and I never will. I think the reasons are obvious. > > Too bad, and I'm not taking the bait to debate this. That'll take > us off topic. It suffices to say that given the need for real-time > notification, opportunistic TLS is needed for SMTP delivery of > reports. Wasn't supposed to be bait and I'm also not interested in discussing this topic. I think we have very different viewpoints on that one. Just as Opportunistic TLS: "MAYTLS" MAY indeed pave the way for downgrade attacks, or am I missing something? I'd just like to note to the chairs; the way the discussion has changed on -tlsrcpt I'm currently totally -1 on this one (and that was the document I had the least problems with), I'm aware that you already adopted the document, but this is just the wrong way to do things in my opinion. Aaron
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