On Friday, 19 March 2021 15:12:25 CET, Eliot Lear (elear) wrote:
On 19 Mar 2021, at 12:20, Hubert Kario <[email protected]> wrote:
it's also a place that needs to keep on moving forward as new attacks and
more powerful computers come into light every year
Sure. That’s why I support the draft.
which nothing short of
MUST NOT seems to get across.
Why would you think that in this case? The IEEE has been
remarkably good at tracking our work, as have a great many
other organizations, but for uses you’ve never considered.
That’s why code like OpenSSL is deployed in places you’ve
never heard of. And while you’re right, we’re not the
protocol police, it’s bad when we give developers advice they
simply cannot follow because they live in the real world.
they also need to accept the reality that their use-case is a niche use
case for the whole ecosystem, so not all things will align nicely and not
all advice will be applicable to them
Is it? There are hundreds of millions of devices that cover
this use case, and that number is accelerating.
and how it's a good thing that the number of devices that can't have their
software updated is accelerating?
so maybe, we should give them a little bit of credit and
assume that they are
able to differentiate stuff that makes sense in their context from stuff
that's applicable to the web in general
And herein lies the problem: either this document is intended
for the “web” or it is intended to be general. The two are not
the same. I like scoping this document broadly, though, to mark
what is currently a best practice. And THEN you can give those
people credit for doing the right thing, because they largely
have in the past.
To be clear: this is a bit of a juggernaut. The idea that a
device identity survives through the entire lifetime of a device
very much depends on what that lifetime is. Toys and IT
equipment have 3-5 year lifetimes. Some sensors have six week
lifetimes. Some stuff in the ground has 40-50 year lifetimes,
and some mechanical tools like presses have 120 year lifetimes.
So sure. 802.1AR is going to need to evolve around these
concepts. But let’s please just recognize the reality we face,
that the currently deployed systems are going to be around for
quite a while, they will continue to verify as they do, and
their certs won’t change, at least for onboarding purposes.
the whole point of it is to say: this is how you this TLS stuff,
if you don't do it like this, you really should have a good excuse
but it's not IETF job to find those excuses, and it's not IETF job to
ensure that you're able to use IETF protocols, unchanged, for 50
years
now, just because you have an excuse, doesn't mean you don't have a
liability, just like the people that run lathes or presses using
Windows 95 PCs
--
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
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