Hi Rich,

On 28/09/2021 15:20, Salz, Rich wrote:

I am proposing the following for the security section.  Any comments?  In particular, what about the “multiple identifiers” at the last few lines?  Should that go away now?  If so, that will have ripple effects.  This text is currently at https://github.com/richsalz/draft-ietf-uta-rfc6125bis/pull/29 <https://github.com/richsalz/draft-ietf-uta-rfc6125bis/pull/29>

# Security Considerations {#security}

## Wildcard Certificates {#security-wildcards}

Wildcard certificates, those that have an identifier with "\*" as the

left-most DNS label, automatically vouch for any single-label host names

within their domain, but not multiple levels of domains.  This can be

convenient for administrators but also poses the risk of vouching for rogue

or buggy hosts. See for example {{Defeating-SSL}} (beginning at slide 91) and

{{HTTPSbytes}} (slides 38-40).

Protection against a wildcard that identifies a public suffix

{{Public-Suffix}}, such as `*.co.uk` or `*.com`, is beyond the scope of this

document.

## Internationalized Domain Names {#security-idn}

Allowing internationalized domain names can lead to the inclusion of visually

similar, or confusable, characters in certificates.  For discussion, see for

example {{IDNA-DEFS}}.

## Multiple Identifiers {#security-multi}

A given application service might be addressed by multiple DNS domain names

for a variety of reasons, and a given deployment might service multiple

domains or protocols.  The client MUST use the TLS Server Name Identification

(SNI) extension as discussed in {{TLS, Section 4.4.2.2}}.

I don't think this MUST is appropriate, as this is not universally required by different protocols. I would rather rephrase this as a good way of addressing this issue.

If multiple

protocols share the same port, the client MUST use the Application-Layer

Protocol Negotiation as described in {{ALPN}}.

The last sentence: the client might have no idea, this is not necessarily something common or known to the client. At least not common outside of Web.

To rephrase this, I think this MUST requirement is outside of scope of this document.

To accommodate the workaround that was needed before the development

of the SNI extension, this specification allows multiple DNS-IDs,

SRV-IDs, or URI-IDs in a certificate.


Best Regards,

Alexey

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