On Fri, 2004-01-23 at 09:17, Ross Werner wrote: > On Fri, 23 Jan 2004, Soren Harward wrote: > > > This question is inspired by the thread on encrypted filesystems, but > > merits its own thread. Everyone knows about keeping unauthorized users > > out of data they shouldn't have access to. But what about granting > > authorized users access to data they should be able to access, but not > > permitting them to redistribute it? > > In my opinion, it's just a completely impossible pipe dream. Computers are > built so that, in order to display the information on the screen, it has > to make a copy of it. If you can display it, you can copy it, somehow. > > The only possible way to do this is to have a completely unbroken chain of > closed, DRM'd technology all the way up to the display. But even then, > you run the risk of (a) reverse engineering, and (b) I can still take a > photograph of the screen, if it's that important. (And if it were the sort > of situation as at Los Alamos, it would be that important.)
Good point. I rescind my previous post. Security in general is a pipe dream. If it's that important, don't connect your computer to the internet, don't show it to anyone else, lock your doors, and plan on it getting out anyway. Seriously though, there are things that aren't _that_ important, but you still want to keep the honest (and not so clever) people honest, and at least deter the dishonest (and clever) people. I mean, why do you lock your doors on your car, they are easy to pop open if you know what you are doing? Why do you lock your bike with flimsy chain? A good pair of bolt cutters will do away with that in a second. Why put a password on your computer, anyone who knows how to boot it into single user mode can get around it? Nothing is completely secure, but every bit of security can help. Bryan ____________________ BYU Unix Users Group http://uug.byu.edu/ ___________________________________________________________________ List Info: http://uug.byu.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/uug-list
